This vuln was found in Sargent & Greenleaf locks. These are UL-listed locks suitable for securing cash in commercial establishments. They have no key bypass.
These locks have the batteries outside the safe, so there is no dead battery issue. However, this enables easy current measurements, as the hacker showed.
FYI, at this level there are no "electronic safes" - just regular safes with electronic locks, which have the same form factor as mechanical safe locks.
Why an electronic lock? Much faster to enter the combo, proof against robo-dialers, can maintain an audit trail of multiple employees, can issue different combinations to different employees and revoke access.
Wouldn't a simple capacitor foil that attack?
I generally see a battery compartment on the exterior, so if the batteries die you just replace them and then enter the code. Sometimes the key lock does something like immobilize the dial or handle, so it's a second factor, not a bypass.
>Why pay all that money and get nothing in return?
On consumer-level safes, who knows. Beyond that: individually identify users, revoke specific users, have an audit trail of who opened it when, make the ACLs depend on time of day.
Electronic locksmithing is not in it's infancy. The FF-L-2740B specification is already a 5 year old.
So there is no mechanical lock fallback. The fact that you can remove the batteries (and even the number pad) without unlocking the safe does seem to present some DoS attacks, but I assume that isn't a major concern.
[1] http://www.sargentandgreenleaf.com/pdf/630-302_6120_op.pdf
Why not just have an A/C port somewhere so you can supply your own power if the battery dies? The worst a criminal could do at that point is try to crank a high amperage current through it and try to fry the computer, which would not unlock it.
[1] http://www.yale.co.uk/en/yale/couk/productsdb/smart-locks/Ke...
1. Every mechanical lock can be opened using a tool called ITL2000. It is a robotic arm that tests all the combos of the mechanical lock.
2. The maintenance of codes in a bank using mechanical locks is very complicated and costly. When the person in a branch who knows the combo takes holidays a locksmith has to go to the branch to change the combination, for example. In an electronic lock (SG-6121) there are the master code and 9 codes, one of them opens the lock without waiting for the delay.
Clearly, that standard is a little ridiculous.
The batteries may die, which means there must be a physical lock as well. Either the physical lock is less secure than the electronic lock (in which case an attacker will focus on the physical lock) or it is more secure than the electronic lock (in which case why not rely on the physical lock?).
That doesn't even begin to get into the fact that the profession of electronic locksmithing is still in its infancy and as a result electronic locks tend to be laughably insecure in the first place. The whole reason to have a safe is to keep things … safe. Why pay all that money and get nothing in return?