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A comment on Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers via Hard Drive Noise. Parent comment

Re:Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers v... by nickpsecurity on Friday August 12, 2016 @10:19AM (#12275826)
Clive Robinson on Schneier's blog came up with a thorough notion years ago: energy leaks plus "energy gapping" systems. He said if any form of energy or matter could transfer from one system toward anothet device then it should be considered a potential leak. So, you have to physically isolate them then block the whole spectrum practically.

Each new story supports his model. Energy gapping for the win.

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Re:Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers v... by xgbi on Friday August 12, 2016 @11:01AM (#12276241)
Yeah, you could probably modulate some CPU load and emit noise from the capacitors that are sitting on the power stage of the CPU.

Scary stuff...

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Re:Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers v... by pbsd on Friday August 12, 2016 @02:41PM (#12277833)
https://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/
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Re:Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers v... by JulianMorrison on Friday August 12, 2016 @11:01AM (#12276238)
In other words, it's roughly as hard as keeping a quantum qbit from decohering, and for the same reason.

Not so trivial, then.

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Re:Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers v... by nickpsecurity on Friday August 12, 2016 @12:09PM (#12276733)
Haha. I won't go that far. You just shield from as many forms of sounds, light, EM, etc as you can. Alternatively, build memory and info-flow security into your hardware, do POLA at device level, and use TEMPEST-style hardware. Also, as in EMSEC tents or safes, one can separate security levels into their own shielded cages/racks. Already products for that although not sure if energy gapping is thorough enough.
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