Re:Cryp.sr - a minimal host-proof cryptographic textpad
by NateLawson on Monday March 29, 2010 @02:06PM
(#1227130)
I read that as: "current web app designs are bad, and this is no worse." But that assumes we can only choose your JS crypto or other bad web app designs, a false alternative. There is a third option.
What ever happened to all the other non-web-app crypto that has been doing much better for the past 20 years (PGP, SSL, /dev/urandom)? How does your solution compare to those?
Re:Cryp.sr - a minimal host-proof cryptographic textpad
by cortesi on Monday March 29, 2010 @06:03PM
(#1227691)
These things are entirely orthogonal. The "host-proof" paradigm is specifically a web application design paradigm -
the question we're asking is "how can we do web apps better". Unless you're able to convince your mom to interact with Facebook using PGP, it's just not relevant to this discussion.
As an aside, I would _love_ for browsers to expose a good, standardized set of crypto routines. They don't, so we do the only thing we can - implement them in Javascript. This makes me as queasy as anyone, but it's the best we can do at the moment.
It's early days, but I think that given published client-side source, enough users to provide vigorous peer review, and a verification mechanism like AppHash (which guards against exactly the kind of injection you talk about), it's possible to get it right.