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Re:Cryp.sr - a minimal host-proof cryptographic textpad by glymor on Monday March 29, 2010 @10:01AM (#1226525)
The part from AppHash on covers verifying the downloading code matches the externally released / peer reviewed version.

He does seem to be trusting twitter however (and twitter isn't host-proof). Spreading out or mirroring the discussion could give you a high confidence but I think you'd need something like PGP's chain of trust to be provably secure.

Re:Cryp.sr - a minimal host-proof cryptographic textpad by andrewcooke on Monday March 29, 2010 @01:37PM (#1227041)
oo, interesting - sorry, i didn't read that far.

even better (from my pov) would be something that worked similarly, but used used a local cache and told you when pages changed. i imagine it would always warn on first change and then flag pages that always change as "insecure", pages that have changed just now as "hack attempt" and pages that are constant as "original". you could imagine browser bar colours that signal those...

this is the same kind of approach i think should be used with SSL certification (indicating when the CA changes for a particular page), which would help secure against the recent discussion of govts pressuring CAs to sign fake certs (and obviously isn't new - it's basically what ssh does).

[edit: hmm, although what page is completely constant? when my bank balance changes i don't want an error flagged. no idea how you solve that in general]

Re:Cryp.sr - a minimal host-proof cryptographic textpad by cortesi on Monday March 29, 2010 @05:56PM (#1227669)
AppHash tries to address this by having something called a "hostile block" in a page. The hash is checked for everything BUT the hostile block, and the hostile block itself is checked to make sure it only contains static variable assignments. Yes, this is a fiddly bit of code - I'd love for people to see if they could break it.