Librevault: Open source zero-knowledge peer-to-peer file sync

Re:Librevault: Open source zero-knowledge peer-to-peer file ... by GamePad64 on Wednesday August 10, 2016 @02:06PM (#12263687)

During the indexing procedure, the value of SHA3-224(AES256(data)) is computed for each chunk.

Then, the list of these hashes is placed into Meta structure. After that, this Meta is ECDSA-signed using a EC point, decoded from A-type secret.

Any other type of secret contain the public part of EC point and can verify the signature.

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Re:Librevault: Open source zero-knowledge peer-to-peer file ... by swordswinger12 on Wednesday August 10, 2016 @06:44PM (#12265234)

So is there a per-chunk MAC, or do you rely on the signed hashes of ciphertext for the integrity and authenticity of each chunk?

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Re:Librevault: Open source zero-knowledge peer-to-peer file ... by GamePad64 on Thursday August 11, 2016 @01:59PM (#12270368)

Actually, there is per-chunk HMAC support in the protocol and present revisions add HMAC for each chunk into Meta: https://github.com/Librevault/librevault-common/blob/master/...

This HMAC is computed over plaintext chunks and used to determine, if we already have this chunk in database (because of random IV we get different hash of ciphertext every time), not for verification.

And what is wrong about verifying integrity and authenticity by hash-then-sign?

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Re:Librevault: Open source zero-knowledge peer-to-peer file ... by swordswinger12 on Thursday August 11, 2016 @07:55PM (#12272591)

Maybe nothing, but it's just kind of a weird, nonstandard way of doing things. Also it's not immediately obvious to me that your method meets modern security definitions like IND-CCA2.

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