The telco industry tells the banking industry not to consider SMS secure...
The Telco's prime motivations are to make it easy for their customers to make more calls and send more text messages - that's what make them money. Making it difficult to port phone numbers away from competitors, or making it difficult for customers to redirect phone calls or text messages is bad for business, and will lose them customers and/or increase customer support costs.
There's absolutely no upside to a Telco for doing any of that - they don't really care if that makes their product less secure for use-cases other 3rd parties who aren't paying the Telco - the Telco's never signed up to provide a secure channel for your bank to send secrets to you - and the banks aren't offering to pay them for it. The Telco's customers are paying, and to an overwhelming degree they demonstrate that they prefer convenience over security - you get pissed off and potentially change carriers very quickly if you cant call them up from a friend's phone when yours get broken/stolen and get your calls/texts redirected to another number immediately. The fact that that same ability give access to social engineers to get hold of banking pins and internet service 2fa secrets is a vanishingly small concern for the people paying the Telco's.
So they just don't care. Not their problem. Sucks to be a bank.
Not that I think we'll be rid of SS7 even a decade from now, but there is a reasonable path to take, yes ?
IMO the real issue here is that almost all websites consider that email is a good way to verify the identity of someone when they want to reset their password, while in reality email is a terrible medium. Attacks on the DNS work, and a lot of SMTP traffic is still plaintext. The way to secure email is to encrypt and sign at endpoints but of course websites don't do this in the reset password flow.
That said, many websites use a Twilio two-factor integration and don't support anything else. If that's the case, you should still use it.
Well, it's not recommended:
>> Due to the risk that SMS messages may be intercepted or redirected, implementers of new systems SHOULD carefully consider alternative authenticators. If the out of band verification is to be made using a SMS message on a public mobile telephone network, the verifier SHALL verify that the pre-registered telephone number being used is actually associated with a mobile network and not with a VoIP (or other software-based) service. It then sends the SMS message to the pre-registered telephone number. Changing the pre-registered telephone number SHALL NOT be possible without two-factor authentication at the time of the change. OOB using SMS is deprecated, and may no longer be allowed in future releases of this guidance.
Source: NIST (https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html)