It sure makes for a nice contrarian opinion, but fighting politically vs technically is a needless dichotomy. At least this post attempts to back up this assertion, but it seems a quite handwavey to assume that because eg a protocol contains key escrow, that governments aren't still going to want to preemptively read, archive, and datamine the cleartext.

Yes, all governments. Because governments, even democratic ones, fundamentally desire power. The best political argument we have is getting working strong encryption into the hands of everybody and making them appreciate the security it gives them. Presently, they have no choice about being personally surveilled, so they might as well lobby for everyone else to be surveilled as well.

As an aside, HTTPS is easy to coopt by network operators because it is a terribly naive protocol:

- fingerprintable, even going so far as to put the site name in the clear!

- naming system that assumes unfettered Internet access

- generally requires communication for every micro action

- crypto keys are disconnected from naming, requiring binding together by ambient third party

- naming system based on specific servers inevitably leading to centralized data silos that will be governmentally or economically coopted

(Yes, the problems are centered around naming. It's one of the 3^h2 hard things in computer science, yet is easy to ignore when focused on the details of transferring data)