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Re:In Nuclear Silos, Death Wears a Snuggie (2011) by Someone on Sunday August 07, 2016 @11:19AM (#12242284)
"The process was rigorous, thorough and fully governed by a checklist that was, to our knowledge, without defect. The room for human error was minimal."

So, this would be easy to automate. I often wonder whether part of the reason both the USSR and the USA put people in this process was that the hope was that those humans would not go through with real orders.

If the idea was that it (also) would help in detecting cases where the electronic parts of the system fail, that is clear indication that those in charge thought the humans in would sometimes deviate from the script.

Re:In Nuclear Silos, Death Wears a Snuggie (2011) by chakalakasp on Sunday August 07, 2016 @02:40PM (#12243091)
Having humans inbetween the automated steps reduces potential errors introduced by bugs or compromised software. If the last step in Cryptolocker was "Now have the user manually enter in terminal commands to encrypt each individual file", the virus wouldn't work at all. Requiring two human beings to agree with each other that an alert is legitimate and for them to both need to confirm coded messages, target the missiles and to simultaneously turn four keys at the same time - it's a pretty big meat-based firewall for malicious or buggy code.

Not that what runs the silos is really that easy to mess with. They still do software updates with eight inch floppy disks.

Re:In Nuclear Silos, Death Wears a Snuggie (2011) by lisper on Sunday August 07, 2016 @02:52PM (#12243132)
> Not that what runs the silos is really that easy to mess with.

I dunno. This seems pretty hinky to me:

"wireless Nintendo Wii controllers could cause the system to detect a false electromagnetic pulse attack and shut down."

Re:In Nuclear Silos, Death Wears a Snuggie (2011) by alttab on Sunday August 07, 2016 @12:29PM (#12242521)
In the age of the internet, having safe-guards from hacks and redundancies in place to ensure that messages are not misread seems like standard engineering IMO. AFAIK, every nuke that was ever launched was supposed to be launched, and we haven't had a single misfire, or lack of launch, that I'm aware of.
Re:In Nuclear Silos, Death Wears a Snuggie (2011) by Someone on Sunday August 07, 2016 @01:51PM (#12242873)
I do not see how adding redundancy to such a tiny part of the command chain would help much. You would have to make all parts of the system redundant. For example, were the messages sent in duplicate via two separate channels?

If not, Mallory (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob#Cast_of_charac...) could send launch codes to a bunker, all persons on duty would verify it to be correct, and they would launch their IBCMs.

The only thing this helps against is the single rogue soldier; that risk goes away, too, if you remove all soldiers from the chain.

Re:In Nuclear Silos, Death Wears a Snuggie (2011) by TaylorAlexander on Sunday August 07, 2016 @02:46PM (#12243112)
People do all these extra checks that computers don't do though. Like, if it's a sunny Tuesday afternoon and all is well, when suddenly launch codes arrive, the humans are probably going to say "ummm... I don't remember nuclear war being on the agenda today. Lets get the commander to call the president." That may be in complete violation of the protocol, but it could be the right thing to do.

Humans are more apt to see that something is amiss than computers are.

Re:In Nuclear Silos, Death Wears a Snuggie (2011) by gumby on Sunday August 07, 2016 @03:55PM (#12243370)
Yup. This is why these guys get classified intelligence briefings before going on duty (in this article the ones that had been five minutes long and are now hour-long powerpointfests).
Re:In Nuclear Silos, Death Wears a Snuggie (2011) by samatman on Sunday August 07, 2016 @12:55PM (#12242620)
So, the first ten minutes of War Games?