you can't send the tainted coins to an exchange or a bank, because they risk getting seized and your identity compromised
you can give someone the private key on a flash drive for goods, services, or an army.
you can move varying amounts to different addresses each for a different flash drive, to exchange for goods, services, or an army.
physical transfers wouldn't show up on the blockchain.
you can also mix them over time for whatever amount you need. $50,000 a day wouldn't be impractical.
and you can also build up your own bitcoin infrastructure yourself, start another bitcoin casino and all the players get paid out in your otherwise tainted coins
do an ICO for a new project and fund it with all your tainted coins, and others. most crowdsales - like Ethereum's - have one or two large investors amongst the little amounts everyone else contributes.
honestly all the transparency perks of the blockchain is just to rosy it up to regulators. but it undermines any and every capital control in existence.
(no sarcasm here, I totally agree that's what the ecosystem is like.)
> you can give someone the private key on a flash drive for goods, services, or an army.
But for this part, what if the one who gives out the private key moves the coins later? That's not a finalized transaction at all if both side have the private key.
Conceptually It can be alleviated with having the coins in multisig address where a third party creates one of the signing keys and the original thief retained one, and ideally the second recipient also had a third signing key. Still have the problem of getting the third signing key generated in a way that required no trust, in advance
Are the destination wallet addresses for the heist visible in any block chain explorers? Would it even be possible to mix those coins or will they be impossible to spend as tainted?