As such, a number of attack/bugs found in other operating systems, don't impact OpenBSD because they were forward looking.
I'm wondering if you've had a chance to review the change in thinking that the OpenBSD organization has had in the last 6 years, and how it might impact your original 2010 post?
There are important differences. pledge requires you to modify an application. SELinux can sandbox any application, including untrusted applications (see the use of SELinux in Android).
Since SELinux is external to the application, a system administrator can specify/refine a policy, while pledge calls are compiled in.
As such, a number of attack/bugs found in other operating systems, don't impact OpenBSD because they were forward looking.
This vision is not exclusive to OpenBSD. Red Hat Enterprise Linux has included many of the same mitigation techniques for a long time (starting at RHEL 3 in 2003). Moreover, they have shipped SELinux, which is arguably more powerful than pledge since RHEL 4 in 2005.
(I don't want to discredit the work of the OpenBSD developers, which is great. I just want to point out that there are Linux distributions with similar features, wider hardware support, and wider vendor support. Many OpenBSD supporters just seem to ignore work by others in order to push their favorite system.)
I"m just wondering whether tptacek has rethought his comment from 2010 about OpenBSD " its model depends on shipping bug-free distributions " given a lot of success OpenBSD has had in the past several years dodging exploits that resulted from bug-present distribution issues, that its OS compartmentalization approach has successfully avoided.
The stuff going on with pledge is a step forward! I like 2016 OpenBSD more than I did 2010 OpenBSD.
(I was, as you probably know, involved in OpenBSD in the 1990s, and then, because I worked for a company staffed by Monkey.org people, shipped a demanding product on it --- both experiences left a bad taste in my mouth).
> That brings us to our third—and today, still experimental—alternative: deep learning. Connect the critical state variables of the system to a deep-learning neural network. Train the network with a blend of normal operation, known attacks, and randomly injected faults. You may never know how the resulting network operates, and you can’t prove that the network is sufficient or even correct. But in complex systems it is likely to out-perform human-devised rule lists
[1] http://systemdesign.altera.com/system-security-a-model-from-...
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1997385