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Re:The sad state of Linux download security by zdkl on Sunday July 17, 2016 @01:03PM (#12110806)
You're assuming the server is secure
Re:The sad state of Linux download security by Etzos on Sunday July 17, 2016 @01:09PM (#12110826)
If the source server is compromised then nothing can help you. All source links can be changed to something malicious and all verification methods can be different to match the ones of the bad file. If the source server is compromised there is no way to accurately verify the file's source (unless using verified PGP signatures which you've already vetted).
Re:The sad state of Linux download security by zdkl on Monday July 18, 2016 @05:24AM (#12113993)
That's my point. Why go to the trouble of securing the transport layer if you're both NOT using PGP AND assuming with no proof that the server isn't compromised? I mean sure "security all the things" pays my ramen but at some point youve gotta wonder if you wouldn't be better off securing a trusted signature transmission method and comparing your insecure downloads to those provably correct signatures. I'm not complaining, in the end clients assuming the server is uncompromised "because otherwise we'd be boned" and relying on transport security on top of that has secured me most of my work this past year... :)
Re:The sad state of Linux download security by minitech on Monday July 18, 2016 @05:36AM (#12114032)
> Why go to the trouble of securing the transport layer if you're both NOT using PGP AND assuming with no proof that the server isn't compromised?

To guard against MITMs as well as DNS spoofing to an extent.

Re:The sad state of Linux download security by minitech on Sunday July 17, 2016 @01:07PM (#12110817)
Yes. If you assume the server isn’t secure, there’s no point in any of the other things except the PGP signature, the keys corresponding to which I wouldn’t be able to get anywhere without making some other assumption of security.