Re:Rustls: new, modern TLS library written in Rust
by mcpherrinm on Sunday July 10, 2016 @04:37AM
(#12064966)
Yeah, trying to make TLS client identity private is a recipe for sadness (well, before 1.3).
At least in the environments I use TLS, which is interservice datacenter communications, there are no privacy issues (especially since you can just look at what container a connection comes from for the same amount of identity leaking).
Re:Rustls: new, modern TLS library written in Rust
by gue5t on Sunday July 10, 2016 @09:04AM
(#12065467)
Thank you, this is a very good explanation and now I'm convinced that this is the right thing to do.
But I do need mutual authentication, and want to avoid rolling my own crypto for it--so does Rustls expect to support client auth in TLS 1.3 when that spec is finalized and implemented?
1. client auth in TLS1.2 and earlier is done at the wrong time in the handshake. As a result the client's identity (which unlike the server identity usually identifies a user; see sibling comment which confirms this) is sent in the clear. That's a big privacy failure.
2. to work around (1), some implementations do an initial server-auth handshake, then immediately renegotiate up to mutual-auth (renegotiations are encrypted). Renegotiation has quite a dismal history, and I definitely want to avoid it.
3. as a follow on from (2), the standard never described what implementations are expected to do if client/server identities change during renegotiation. This (partially) resulted in https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE
All of these are fixed in TLS1.3: client identities are encrypted and renegotiation is dropped.