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Re:Venezuela Refuses to Default, and Few People Seem to Unde... by dragonwriter on Friday July 08, 2016 @04:57PM (#12058592)
> If something is too big to fail - it must be killed immediately.

No, if its too big to fail, it must not be allowed to fail -- but also must be as expeditiously as possible broken up into units which are not too big to fail.

Re:Venezuela Refuses to Default, and Few People Seem to Unde... by Florin_Andrei on Friday July 08, 2016 @07:29PM (#12059297)
Kind of like gradually splitting up your giant monster truck Java thing running all your endpoints into a variety of microservices.
Re:Venezuela Refuses to Default, and Few People Seem to Unde... by dragonwriter on Friday July 08, 2016 @07:40PM (#12059342)
> Kind of like gradually splitting up your giant monster truck Java thing running all your endpoints into a variety of microservices.

That's a perfectly apt analogy. "Too big to fail = must be killed immediately" is like saying if you have an Java monolith that is a SPOF for your entire business, you must immediately blow up the server running it to protect yourself from the danger of it failing later...

Re:Venezuela Refuses to Default, and Few People Seem to Unde... by venomsnake on Friday July 08, 2016 @07:34PM (#12059322)
I am afraid you are wrong. Any entity strong enough to blackmail you into bailing it out, is strong enough to demand for the bailout to be no strings attached.
Re:Venezuela Refuses to Default, and Few People Seem to Unde... by dragonwriter on Friday July 08, 2016 @07:48PM (#12059367)
> Any entity strong enough to blackmail you into bailing it out, is strong enough to demand for the bailout to be no strings attached.

"Too big to fail" -- if they genuinely are [0] -- banks are not in a position to blackmail anyone into bailing them out; the danger of them failing is indirect effects of that failure, not actions the bank triggers if it is not bailed out -- its not blackmail. While policymakers have a strong public-interest incentive to prevent them from failing (that's literally what "too big to fail" describes), they have a similar public interest incentive to take steps to make sure that they aren't in the position to choose between similar failures and costly bailouts in the future -- and, quite often, the way that manifests is through conditions on the bailout which can extend as far as government taking control of the institution it is bailing out.

This is born out by the past history of US government bailouts of institutions that were deemed to critical to the economy to fail, many of which had management conditions attached, and some of which extended to government taking significant control of the entity for some period, and those who previously controlled the entity losing out -- the entity (itself a legal fiction created by government) was preserved, the actual people the entity belonged to were not always bailed out.

There are times when bailouts had no or weak conditions, which may be a policy failure, but clearly does not demonstrate that imposing conditions on bailouts is impossible.

[0] "Too big to fail" can also be an pretext for policy-maker favors to people with whom they have personal, social-class, or other connections, rather than a genuine fact, in which case its still not blackmail, but a whole different problem.