The fact that users are supposed to just guess about what access sites have or have not authorized, with felony charges for anyone who gets it wrong, does not make sense to me when they have the means to express their rules for authorization in code.
That's why I say you should have to intentionally deceive those rules (or their people) to get in.
The idea that we should be deliberately vague about where the boundaries are and let people stumble into felonies doesn't make any sense to me. The idea that we should let someone write that into a thousand page ToS also doesn't sit well with me. I'd rather it be a question of fact.
Take the case about modifying the URL. It's normal to be able to type any URL I like. Why should it be a felony if I try other IDs? I'm simply making a request, it's up to them to decide what access I should or should not have, or even googlebot may end up being a felon. The fact is that much of the web is and always has been open by default. Anonymous FTP is normal... if you want authentication, you should configure that. The idea that someone could be a felon because they were somehow supposed to know that your misconfigured FTP server wasn't supposed to let them in is simply unreasonable and it only works out because prosecutions are rare.
That's why I want a proper boundary. If you're not deliberately hacking someone or social engineering someone and if the only thing you do is to report the bug you found to responsible parties (the site owner/operator or government) I'm not willing to charge someone with a felony for modifying a URL or logging into anonymous FTP or whatever else like that.
If you want to advocate for liability for software security negligence, I won't argue --- at least, not on a moral basis (I think "be careful what you ask for" but whatever).
But I do not see what any of this has to do with liability for intruders.
I think people would start seeing more social costs for running businesses negligently if they couldn't point to iffy hacking prosecutions to justify themselves.
If all it takes to get something is to request it, without any interaction and thus without any fraud, then it's public.
What's the difference between me calling a phone number and asking for a company's financials before they're publicly released, and checking the probable URL before they're publicly released?
The first isn't a crime, why is the second?
I mean that you keep presuming that we're discussing intruders which implies guilt, but when viewed in a more realistic context, as requesters, your comments about liability aren't relevant.
Nobody is at fault for simply asking for a document in the real world and nobody should be online.
You're the one trying to move the goalposts and alter premises. You reframe everything in a violent physical metaphor even though you've been around long enough to know that it's the least useful thing to compare information to. I can't copy a house by looking at it so it's a crappy analogy for a website.
There's a world of difference between asking for a document and opening a door and taking it.
Another way of putting this is that they are using the computer to express their intention to authorize (or not authorize) access by means of the programming. It should, as a matter of good public policy, be on them to get this right. That's why my standard would require material deception--that is, but for the intentional deception, access would not have been granted.
Anything less simply sets too low a bar and excuses incompetence. This is bad public policy because it allows people to stumble into felonies while excusing all kinds of negligence on the part of those people who were supposed to be protecting things. Otherwise we have an "I know it when I see it" standard for which parts of a site are okay to interact with and reasonable minds can (and frequently do) disagree over the particulars. My standard would move this rule to determining statements of fact--did they know or should they have known they were deceiving this computer system/person in order to gain access? It also deliberately prevents people from shifting the blame for negligently configuring access to their computers.
I think we both know the widespread public harm caused by networks of hacked computers and we both know that, unlike the real world, essentially every computer's locks and windows are tested many times a day. Leaving things open is clearly negligent in my view and I've seen far too many clients of mine leave vulnerabilities open longer than is justifiable, contrary to my advice. I mean, I still see PCI audits reporting POODLE, which is just sad.
Now, inasmuch as you're telling me that the law doesn't and isn't likely to see things my way, sadly, I have to agree with you there.