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Re:Apple File System by majewsky on Monday June 13, 2016 @05:14PM (#11897712)
Why would you need encryption for the Secure Boot chain? Would you not rather sign the base system image for that purpose?
Re:Apple File System by derefr on Monday June 13, 2016 @08:40PM (#11898959)
You'd have to sit there and read the entire base system image before booting to verify that signature. But only have to decrypt a block when it comes time to read that block—with the ability to kernel-abort right then during the boot process if the block doesn't decrypt. (Or were you suggesting individually signing every block?)
Re:Apple File System by nwf on Monday June 13, 2016 @09:14PM (#11899094)
You don't sign the whole image as a stream, and you don't sign every block. Recursion is your friend! You sign the Merkle tree root, check it once, and then check O(log n) hashes per block access. You can, of course, amortize the checking of the first several of those hashes as a further optimization that ties in easily with your caching layer.

There's no such thing as "the block doesn't decrypt" absent MACs/MICs or AEAD schemes -- encryption and decryption are just maps from N bytes to N bytes.