And the only reason they've been able to reach $4B in AUM so quickly is because record-low interest rates and stagnating growth in the developing world have created a rush of capital to Silicon Valley looking for any semblance of alpha.
The real question we should be asking is what sector of the economy all this roving capital will target next, when it becomes clear that tech startups can't live up to the promises of the VCs.
> I guess I am mostly interested to see how the "founder as rockstar" thesis that is central to a16z works in practice.
That's just a sales message used to get gullible and desperate founders to take money from them without giving it a second thought. When things go south, like they did for Zenefits (YC W13), a16z won't be so nice anymore:
> On Feb. 1, Zenefits held an emergency board meeting. The licensing problems and the macro were discussed. [a16z partner] Dalgaard suggested to Conrad that, as the person who created the program, he needed to leave.[0]
I'm not saying they are or aren't profounder. I just think Zenefits is not a good example to use to make sweeping accusations about the firm.
They returned their first fund twice over ... in three years.
http://fortune.com/2012/07/24/nice-ira-andreessen-horowitz-r...
http://blakemasters.com/post/21869934240/peter-thiels-cs183-...
Facebook, Twitter, Skype, AirBNB are why it's so valuable. All you need are a few huge winners.
The ones since 2012 don't seem so great though. Maybe too soon to tell
His "twitter schools" parrot things like Buffett's shareholder letters pretty closely ("When the tide goes out, we find out who's been swimming naked."), so at least at an intellectual level he gets it, but his investment behavior contrasts this strongly, where he seems willing to pay any price for growth. Unfortunately this is common in the investment world, where everyone is a value investor in words, but rarely in behavior.
I guess I am mostly interested to see how the "founder as rockstar" thesis that is central to a16z works in practice.