You've underestimated the reach of the Is-Ought problem. Again, we can't say "humans sometimes practice empathy therefore humans should practice empathy". You, like Sam Harris, start by ignoring the Is-Ought problem and proceed with an assumption "sickness"/pain/suffering is The Objective Negative Standard (says who?) which falls far short of approaching a refutation of Hume's observation. Here is his observation: there is a gap between Facts (that which Is--like "sickness") and Values (moral commands--that which we Ought to do) and this fundamental difference remains.

How was "the sickness of those in this world" chosen as something to avoid, though? You are talking about the means, but the problem are the goals.

Yes, you have to choose the end goal but then you can use rationality.

I'm not sure how you choose a good endpoint. Maybe "life is good" and therefore "expand life". This could lead in many ways though - from fascism to reversing entropy to human experimentation.

It seems most morality for all humans comes down to "what is best for my in group" and then a selectively defined endgroup.

There may be an argument for objective morality being based on expanding knowledge of the universe to the point where we may discover morality? We have very little accurate data on the universe and life in the universe to draw on - maybe as we gain a more accurate and useful model of reality morals will come out of the"woodwork" like writing allowed us to begin pontification on them across generations.

But that's the point; if the endpoint is subjective, all rules derived from it, even if you use an objective system for doing so, are necessarily subjective.

maybe as we gain a more accurate and useful model of reality morals will come out of the"woodwork" like writing allowed us to begin pontification on them across generations.

Maybe it has already happened and we were unable to identify it. How would we distinguish it from all the other theories of rational ethics that come up from time to time?

Empirically.

What is a top goal? Every goal is followed by things to do to achieve it.

A goal which isn't chosen to achieve some higher-level goal.

Taking a sports analogy, you can have the goal of winning a game, so that you get nearer the goal of winning the championship. "Winning the game" is a subgoal.

A top goal would be something that doesn't have an ulterior goal justifying it, you want to achieve it for itself.

I know what you think a "top goal" is and that somehow it is different from a "sub goal". What I'm saying is that there are only goals, they are all the same and you stop at some point only because you decided to.

Why can't I try to win a game just to win it? the answer is of course I can. So at that moment has the goal changed its nature? of course not.

This is the same argument as with "micro" and "macro" evolution. There are no two different evolutions, there is just evolution.

Fine; the distinction is unimportant anyway. How do you empirically chose a moral goal?

You can choose to win a game just to win it. What I don't see is how you can empirically choose to win a game just to win it.

You do it the same way you decide between everything else, you ask a question, collect the data, and then make your decision.

'Should I win the game? every time I don't win I feel bad, but when I win I feel good. I choose to win the game. My objective is just to win the game.'

Ah, but your monologue shows that your goal of winning the game is actually evaluated relatively to another goal, of feeling good. How did you empirically get to that goal?

How can you find a goal (not a subgoal, as in "to achieve X we must do Y", but a top goal) empirically?