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Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by msbarnett on Monday May 30, 2016 @12:52PM (#11802088)
> In order to successfully pull off the MITM attack against TLS connections they will need a rogue CA or cooperation from browsers.

Well, "fortunately", Blue Coat Systems, leading manufacturer of intercept devices for authoritarian regimes, now has an intermediate cert courtesy of Symantec CA, so they're fully capable of issuing and installing MITM certs for use on their clients' devices.

Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by imglorp on Monday May 30, 2016 @03:35PM (#11802706)
Would it be hyperbolic to say vendors like Blue Coat have blood on their hands?

Yeah it's just a tool and yeah your workplace or school might need one to "keep the children safe", and yeah they're not responsible for what their customers do with their products. But when they knowingly sell[1] to repressive governments where bad things happen to dissenters, what does that make them? And please spare us the "terrorist" and "criminal" barf, we've heard it in the West.

Any Blue Coat care to comment?

1. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/blue-coat-acknowledges...

Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by pcl on Monday May 30, 2016 @01:38PM (#11802274)
This is why HSTS pre-loading is so important: https://hstspreload.appspot.com
Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by Canada on Monday May 30, 2016 @01:04PM (#11802133)
Excellent point. The trustworthiness of the CA system demands the revocation of that certificate.
Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by curiousgal on Monday May 30, 2016 @01:06PM (#11802142)
Said trustworthiness should have stopped them from granting the certificate in the first place.
Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by Canada on Monday May 30, 2016 @02:43PM (#11802499)
Yeah. Maybe its issuer should also be revoked for good measure.
Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by cheshire_cat on Monday May 30, 2016 @02:42PM (#11802494)
I was under the impression that they can't issue Sub-CAs because the pathlen of their Cert is set to 0. [0]

They would have to give their private key to their clients to achieve a MITM attack, right?

[0] https://crt.sh/?id=19538258

Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by msbarnett on Monday May 30, 2016 @03:11PM (#11802599)
They might have to deploy their private key on the devices they maintain for their clients, perhaps relying on a secure keystore on-device to try to protect it from client sniffing (presuming quietly selling it to the client isn't part-and-parcel of the deal).

Others have suggested they could provide a cloud-type service to achieve the same result.

Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by cheshire_cat on Monday May 30, 2016 @03:23PM (#11802650)
Thank you, do you have a link with more technical explanations?
Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by predakanga on Monday May 30, 2016 @07:11PM (#11803736)
I'm not entirely familiar with sub-CA specifics, but CloudFlare (at the very least) has developed a system for deploying SSL with off-site private keys[0]; I imagine that could be used in a situation like this.

[0]: https://blog.cloudflare.com/keyless-ssl-the-nitty-gritty-tec...

Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by gruez on Monday May 30, 2016 @02:31PM (#11802453)
You would think that if they did something like this their (or Symantec) CA will be revoked... right guys?
Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by occamrazor on Monday May 30, 2016 @05:23PM (#11803285)
If Blue Coat issues a certified for google.com, then its own intermediate certificate gets revoked by all browser vendors in a matter of days. They can use rogue certificates for targeted attacks, not for mass surveillance.
Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by tomjen3 on Monday May 30, 2016 @03:41PM (#11802740)
How the fuck did they get that and why is Symantec still included in common roots?

Thats literally the one thing you aren't allowed to do as a CA.

Re:Thai government to MITM all internet communications by msbarnett on Tuesday May 31, 2016 @07:10PM (#11810992)
> why is Symantec still included in common roots?

Because they (and the companies they own, like Verisign), are the root of about 30-40% of all active, web-visible ssl certs at the moment.

No browser maker, even Google is going to break that much of the web over one shady intermediate cert. The consequences for users are too high and too many people are willing to excuse it because it's "only" a pathlen=0 and it would be noticed if used en masse so it's "only" useful for targeted attacks by state-actor clients.