GraphicsMagick and ImageMagick popen() shell vulnerability via filename

Re:GraphicsMagick and ImageMagick popen() shell vulnerabilit... by voltagex_ on Sunday May 29, 2016 @07:46PM (#11798795)

The current situation reminds me of OpenSSL after Heartbleed - researchers start paying lots of attention and finding other issues after the "main" one. Sad that this is what it takes for a big, old project like ImageMagick to get some TLC.

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Re:GraphicsMagick and ImageMagick popen() shell vulnerabilit... by ndj7 on Friday June 03, 2016 @04:42PM (#11833127)

There's a crucial difference; OpenSSL was designed to be secure. ImageMagick was designed to support hundreds of codecs and thousands of operations.

You can't pivot design on 1.25 million lines of code (est.) very quickly after 25 years of feature-first development process.

I'm a bit skeptical it will happen at all; it would be a multi-million dollar undertaking. Better to describe its design scope and tradeoffs, and get people to use it properly - sandbox it if it's on the server.

I started Imageflow to solve that problem - a server-focused design with strict design rules: security is first, followed by visual quality, followed by performance. We've kept the codebase to just 10kloc and we are 50% feature complete, but need to get a lot more momentum on Kickstarter to make completion possible. See https://www.imageflow.io

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