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Re:The Single Sign On by pyre on Tuesday March 09, 2010 @01:13PM (#1178988)
If the company is using a recent Active Directory, it's a snap to set up OpenSSO within their environment to consume Kerberos tokens to authenticate the user (in a browser) via passwordless login. From there, you can configure OpenSSO to federate authentication by providing your site a SAML token, which, when consumed for authentication, means that the only thing you really have to worry about is authorization -- e.g., what a given user can do from within your application.

You're forgetting that the client's IT people thought that VPN was 'inherently insecure.' What makes you think that they would install this when they would not install a VPN?

Re:The Single Sign On by bmelton on Tuesday March 09, 2010 @08:18PM (#1179912)
Honestly, it sounds like the software they custom-developed to act in that role was a knockoff of the basic functionality. The flip side is that OpenSSO uses in-built Kerberos encryption, and generates token-based session headers that contain zero sensitive information.

Honestly, you may well have a point, in that the customer may well have only been receptive to the chosen solution because it was custom-developed, but I was mostly balking at the developer's initial reaction of 'impossible'. Not only is it not impossible, it isn't hard to do, and certainly didn't require reinventing the wheel when a perfectly adequate solution exists that would not only have worked well, but worked for de-passwordifying OTHER web services as well (potentially).