In the longer term, sovereign debt defaults, explicit or implicit (your "or" items, including the inflation tax), inevitably follow this type of counter-cyclical spending (statistically, since this tends to be a regional or world-wide thing).
Regarding the sovereign debt defaults, did we have one of those after the great depression? Sovereign debt defaults are associated with financial panics. Don't bind up intermediate (correct or incorrect) steps with the root cause.
If they aren't in the market or to the degree they are less so, investors have no choice but to put their money elsewhere.
As for your question, I don't think we can easily say. E.g. the BLS says the dollar lost 28% of its (CPI) value from 1940 to 1946 ... but I'm not willing to assign blame due to the discontinuity of WWII.
If Japan defaults in its 3rd Lost Decade, will that be the cause of the initial '80s panic or decades of the wrong medicine to deal with it?
(regarding Japan -- the consensus is that they didn't do enough stimulus, and that in addition to their high savings rate is why they fell into a deflationary spiral. the government printing money and handing it out with coupons for blow and hookers would have been a better strategy than what they did)
2) Stagflation is much worse than recessions and bounceback with low interest rates. See: the 1970s. There have been a lot of recessions and a lot of livelihoods ruined over the last 100 years or so to reach our current understanding -- it's likely not perfect, but it is based on experience.
3) That's not what I'm advocating in the slightest, I advocated for targetted government spending to help create/retain jobs, specifically on things that have high externalities for the country. We don't need any more candlesticks or buggy whips, but every state is laying off teachers like crazy and we could certainly use some new bridges and high speed rail.
Regarding your last statement -- a lack of sufficient stimulus up front is the most universally agreed upon reason for the protracted nature of BOTH of those downturns. Like, all of the literature says the exact opposite of what you're saying. Maybe they're all wrong, I dunno. I do know that in both cases, decision makers were motivated by feelings of avoiding borrowing as a fundamental value, which is the right approach all of the time except for specifically during a panic or the beginning of a recession.
2) The government was growing massively in the 50's, 60's, and 70's. If government growth was the solution, why did we get so much of it before the problem?
3) Is the government more likely to subsidize new, growing industries, or old, stagnant ones? Government subsidies will "save" the most jobs when they target industries with low capital requirements (like the ones that rely on cheap labor) rather than ones with high capital requirements (like high-end manufacturing). Venture capital is a tough job; deciding that some guy in DC is going to do an even adequate job at it is a stretch.
It is not "universally agreed." I think we can all agree that both of the cases I cited included an unprecedented level of government spending, coupled with an unprecedented recession.
"I was healthy, then I sneezed and you demanded that I start using leeches. I've never been sicker."
"It is universally agreed that the problem is insufficient leeches."
1) Oversimplification, read an intro to economics book about how the chain of lending actually creates more dollars and wealth without just printing them 2) Not addressing what I was saying. The size of government is irrelevant here, we're talking about stimulus spending -- totally orthogonal. 3) Not addressing what I was saying in the slightest.
It is in fact almost universally agreed that in both of those cases, the government spending was too little too late. By the vast majority of economist who've spent their lives studying this.
Maybe your "gut feeling" is smarter than their decades of research. But I'd suggest you read this: http://www.xkcd.com/675/
EDIT: I'll add a history lesson so we can all learn something today.
1929 - stock market crashes 29-32 - hoover does nothing, economy spirals downwards 32 - FDR elected, massive counter-cyclical public works projects, economy recovers 37 - FDR raises taxes and cuts back on spending as an austerity measure, too early, double-dip
In the case of Japan, similar story except the high savings rate exacerbated it, leading to deflation -- the government printing money and handing it out on a street corner would have been more effective than what they did
I have read intro econ textbooks. The notion that taking a dollar from one party and giving it to another party creates wealth is absurd. At best, you can argue that it will debase the currency (if not, why doesn't it work with any commodity? You can say that if we confiscate X amount of wealth, and give it away, it turns into 2X amount of wealth. But if the wealth is denominated in, e.g., gold, or houses, or publishing rights, it doesn't have similar fecundity.)
Thank you for the comic. It ably makes your point. However, we're talking about a social science, which is at least partially influenced by the need for grants, public approval, speaking engagements, etc. You can't just put the Depression in a supercolider and run tests on it. Because of this, it's more analogous to other ideological popularity contests, like English Lit and Scientology. People have spent decades studying both of those, but it hasn't made them great writers or superhumans. Similarly, economists who study lots of Keynesian economics don't end up making awesomely profitable global macro trades--even Keynes was smart enough to invest based on something other than his own philosophy.
Hoover's spending was unprecedented. It was hardly "nothing". Another timeline to consider:
Dawn of time-Present: Governments attempt to control currency, typically lead to inflationary bubbles, followed by busts.
1936: This is somehow declared a Good Thing.
Actually, it's not orthogonal. In fact, it's quite on point, as stimulus spending tends to become permanent spending, that is, part of govt.
We don't have counter-cyclical spending in the US. We have huge increases during down times and smaller increases during up times. Occasionally the private growth during up times exceeds govt growth. However, it's basically a one-way ratchet.
We do in fact have counter-cyclical spending. You're seeing it now. Obama already announced a spending freeze on domestic programs, so we'll be seeing federal domestic spending decrease in real terms over the next few years.
If you're wondering the last time that federal spending decreased in real terms? It's not "never". It's "the 1990s". (protip: inflation is relevant).
I didn't "assume" that US govt spending grows monotonically in the past. I observed it. If you think that my observation is incorrect, let's see supporting data.
> Adding "but I think this will happen" when it is in no way mandated or apparent doesn't change the facts.
I didn't say that monotonic spending increases are mandated - I said that they happened. If you're going to claim that this time will be different, you get to explain why.
> We do in fact have counter-cyclical spending. You're seeing it now. Obama already announced a spending freeze on domestic programs
Actually, he didn't. He announced a freeze on some types of discretionary spending. That "freeze" excludes the vast majority of the budget and the places where the increases have been occurring.
Similar "freezes" have been announced in the past and didn't happen. Since this one isn't actually reducing spending (contrary to the "now" claim), it's somewhat silly to assume that this time will be any different until it actually is.
> If you're wondering the last time that federal spending decreased in real terms? It's not "never". It's "the 1990s". (protip: inflation is relevant).
I didn't say "never", I said almost never.
The 90s drop came from decreased military spending due to the end of the cold war. The military budget is now small enough that plausible future cuts are less than planned increases in other spending. In other words, that's a one-time event.
1. The government can increase spending, but they can't create money. Either they get it from taxes, or they get it from devaluing the currency (i.e. taxing holders of currency, or currency-denominated assets). How would it help to take $1 away from an employer building widgets, and use it to hire a Diversity Coordinator at the DMV?
2. What's the long-term effect on business decisions if the only two modes the economy is in are a) growth, or b) near-zero interest rates? It looks like this would lead to lots of leverage.
3. You're assuming that it's always better for someone to have a job than to lose it. So you'd end up subsidizing candlestick makers (probably by taxing light bulb factory owners).
At best, this philosophy merely gives everyone a reason to misbehave. At worst, it fines the productive, growing parts of the economy, in order to reward the unproductive, shrinking parts of the economy. America in the 1930's. Japan in the 1990's. How many lost decades will it take to discredit this stuff?