Grsec upstream argues that only accepting part of the whole is worse than having their patches outside mainline in bulk, because it would give developers and users a false sense of security to only provide some of the hardening grsec does.
See this[1] LWN article from 2009, which is a kernel developers post with a comment retort by some grsec developers.
[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/313621/
The frustration is that we are now seven years later and the situation has only gotten worse - plenty of kernel exploits have emerged, no distro is shipping grsec comprehensively, grsec itself had to stop providing stable releases, and it has become more religious than logical as to why many critical features, like the internal bug prevention functionality, never will be mainlined and will be re-implemented with much less thoroughly tested surrogates.
I don't have a lot of sympathy for that position. I respect the work, but not the hostile-to-collaboration approach.
Yep. They keep coming across as treating security as something binary. Either it is secure or it is not.
And the moment even the most convoluted of CVEs gets published, anything affected is in their view insecure. And thus needs to be taken out of production until a fix has been applied.
Frankly it seems quite a number of the most outspoken in the community is not in it for the hohum daily security process, but as some kind of grand joust with "the man". Thus their low water mark for security is "can it stop the NSA".
grsecurity is a big collection of a bunch of different techniques. It isn't a total rethink of the Linux kernel, it is a bunch of patches spread over a large surface area. Some of the changes are far-reaching, yes, but even so, each of the techniques represented in grsecurity could be broken into independent patches. So, why haven't they been? (I honestly don't know why. It's not something I follow closely.)