Maybe because his comment had the tone of:
"For this, I have found a truly wonderful proof, but the margin is too small to contain it."
kernel exploits for OpenBSD are neither theoretical nor impractical.
You put that out there as a bare, standalone statement. No elaboration, no proof.
Your comment might be true, but I would have liked to see some more "meat" in it. Some supporting evidence, some inkling of a truly wonderful proof.
There are a bunch of local kernel exploits, all very practical and reliable. Kernel protections are something OpenBSD lacked until very recently.
That timeline isn't pretty. The OpenBSD guys really needed to be dragged, kicking and screaming, to calling it a "security fix" rather than something milder like a "reliability fix".
And - architecturally - OpenBSD's kernel isn't that different from Linux, both being UNIX-style kernels; to the extent that OpenBSD's kernel has better security than Linux, it's mostly because OpenBSD tends to have fewer (and, sometimes, better-considered) features.
(There's an interesting argument to be had about Linux+grsecurity vs. OpenBSD - focusing on having some cutting-edge parts vs. solid engineering throughout - but that's not the argument we're having.)