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Re:Introducing TAuth: Why OAuth 2.0 is bad for banking APIs ... by e12e on Thursday May 05, 2016 @08:18PM (#11640752)
Well, the malicious application can inject a password-field, and an unsuspecting user might not realize that (s)he is giving an app/attacker the password, and not the correct third party.

User education only goes so far, this type of attack can also make a web view that traditionally asks for a TOTP one-time password code susceptible to leaking a users password, even if the normal login flow doesn't ask for that password.

[ed: note that it's pretty trivial to eg: set up hidden cameras in voting booths, if you want to spy on a few people, or perhaps have people film themselves in a voting booth - the point is rather that if most people make an effort to follow the common rules wrt. voting booths, the system is reasonably secure. And it's not trivial to make similar claims about a (presumably) centralized on-line system.]

Re:Introducing TAuth: Why OAuth 2.0 is bad for banking APIs ... by obeattie on Friday May 06, 2016 @04:30AM (#11642497)
On Mondo, there simply are no passwords at all. Instead, when the user wishes to log into our first-party apps, we send a login link to their registered email.

We'll almost certainly add additional required factors to this process (eg. biometrics), as we see the user logging into the Mondo app on a new device as one of the most critical from a security perspective.

Re:Introducing TAuth: Why OAuth 2.0 is bad for banking APIs ... by e12e on Friday May 06, 2016 @01:12PM (#11645286)
I hope that's not biometrics in a potentially attacker-controlled web-view (if such a thing is possible) - biometrics are difficult to revoke...