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Re:Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman: Post-Quantum Curves... by Natanael_L on Saturday April 30, 2016 @06:47AM (#11601205)
And making it PFS and authenticated isn't even the hard part. Slap on hash signatures to preserve quantum security there too and use temporary key exchange keys, done. Making the key exchange itself work securely is 99% of the work.
Re:Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman: Post-Quantum Curves... by EvgeniyZh on Saturday April 30, 2016 @07:56AM (#11601365)
I just was surprised no one really made post-quantum AKE with PFS. Or at least I haven't managed to find it. The closest thing I saw is this one: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/post-quantum-2015/papers/sess...
Re:Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman: Post-Quantum Curves... by tptacek on Saturday April 30, 2016 @11:50AM (#11602157)
It's too early to do that. Researchers are trying to study whether the primitives are going to work --- ie, that the new hard problems they're based on will hold up against quantum speedups and that they're secure against conventional adversaries. Simple DH is a straightforward backdrop for that problem. Composing DH into an AKE doesn't much help, as long as the primitive is flexible enough.