You don't necessarily know your rng is being attacked.
Rekeying frequently makes passive attacks way harder, so it makes sense to rekey as a often as you can.
What would be, for example, a passive attack against a CS-RNG?
Re:/dev/random – a new approach
by Natanael_L on Tuesday April 26, 2016 @07:59AM
(#11571061)
Sidechannel leaks against mobile devices.
It's very unlikely that a compromise will be temporary. This situation "transient compromise" will never happen. Moreover, once a system is compromised, by definition you cannot trust it until replacing it from a known-good source or backup, at which point, you just start the CSRNG with new entropy.
No system should need or even attempt to recover from a transient compromise, you are just causing a false feeling of security.