Your infrastructure should aim to be robust against people persisting themselves (in this case, something that allows an employee to persist themselves beyond the validity of their credentials is a serious problem whether the hacker does it or not). Where it is not, that's your failing. Charging the hacker for finding out where your infrastructure is failing is perverse since if anything their attack made it easier to spot a failing. If they did persist themeselves, then obviously the cost to fix that belongs on the hacker, but the cost to identify such things is something you should be doing anyway.
I don't understand how you could impute the cost of auditing infrastructure for backdoors that could have been planted in a breach to the victim of the breach, rather than to the person convicted of causing the breach. We're not talking about having each of Trib Corp's applications assessed (the cost of that would be in the many hundreds of thousands of dollars, minimum).
The cost should generally be limited to the actual damage done by the hacker, rather than include things that the company should have been doing anyway.
After someone uses an open window to obtain entry, does that mean that they can be charged with the cost of locating and auditing every copy of every physical key to the premises, on the basis that they could have found one and stolen it while they were in the building?