We already have this concept of "the government can go through your stuff" in the form of search warrants. It's not a leap at all to apply that to encryption, too, even if some specific law gets it wrong at first.
I'm sure if pocket enigma machines were around when these laws were first being put to parchment, there'd have been something in there about encryption from the start.
The problem is that your government wants to break all forms of encryption regardless of where or how they are used. Either they want something like a skeleton key or a method of bypassing the security altogether.
So they're not requesting a search warrant. They are requiring that you hand over the keys to your home or install a special door for them that is always kept unlocked.
The difference is that when it's not the government we're free to disagree. We're only concerned with people wanting to force it on us which these civilians with their personal concerns would not be doing.
> You may disagree with a perhaps naive perspective like that, but that interpretation does not make it any less real.
You may honestly hold a view but that does not make it any more real or sensical.
People want the comfort you describe (easy unlock) and perfect security. They believe it's possible but they resist thinking critically about it.
> For the common people this comes in the form "I believe my dead relative's phone has information which will expose their killer, I want the carrier or manufacturer to make that data available, it's legally my phone, not Apple's or Samsung's, I want that data."
And if the data was in a safe you'd be saying "It's legally my paperwork, not American Safe Co's paperwork. I want that paperwork." If you hadn't planned ahead they wouldn't be able to help you either.
If you don't have anything super-secret or valuable in the safe you can take advantage of bricks-and-mortar key escrow like putting the key/combo in a safe-deposit box, or trusting the manufacturer to hold it such as with restricted keyways and encrypted bitting patterns.
And similarly, you (or rather, the relative who might be killed) could buy a phone with some family unlock option on the cloud backup or they could put their unlock code on a piece of paper, put it in their safe-deposit box, and will it to you in event of their suspicious death.
We're all worse off if unlocking a phone or safe is easy to do without these measures. It's better that a few people lose their paperwork than that none of us are ever secure in ours.
This is a relatively new area, so we must careful to be precise with the terms we are working with. Like naming variables.
>encrypted data should be made available in plaintext
'Encrypted' data that can be rendered as 'plain text' or any other interpretable form of data upon certain conditions being met outside the scope of the initial encrypter is not 'encrypted data.' But could rather be referred to as something like 'concealed data.'
Encrypted data is data that is only accessible to those who have been authorized to access it by the initial encrypter.(setting aside human error in encryption techniques)
This definition follows exactly from the use of modern encryption algorithms. Therefore, encrypted data accessible to anyone other than 'Alice' or 'Bob,' is not in fact encrypted.
You may disagree with a perhaps naive perspective like that, but that interpretation does not make it any less real. There are plenty of common folk who would agree in the above scenario data in plain text should be made available upon lawful request by either carrier or mfg. That's not "the government" and to think so kind of misses the mark.