If dns-01 is currently a blocker for you, and you're willing to run a HTTPd on each server, there might be another option: Redirect all challenge requests (i.e. requests to .well-known/acme-challenge) to a common verification server (i.e. http://irc.example.com/.well-known/acme-challenge/token -> http://verification.example.com/.well-known/acme-challenge/t...). That way, you can run the client on verification.example.com and don't have to deal with distributing the challenge token to all nodes. The verification server can then distribute the certificates and keys to your nodes.
That's one of the recommended solutions for shared-hosting providers who don't want to use DNS-based validation.
DNS-01 is currently available (at least I believe it is -- I think I saw something about its availability recently). The issue is that I will need to write my own DNS-01 client.
Running a HTTPd on each server is a bad idea for us since it increases DDoS attack surface area. This would essentially have the same distribution issue that I would need to solve with a DNS-01 client as well, so either way new code is required.
Yep, dns-01 went live in January. If your DNS server happens to support RFC 2136, take a look at lego[1] - some other provider-specific plugins for DNS are included as well.
I'm not too worried about the DNS integration; we have a fairly easily-automatable DNS infrastructure owing to the fact that we're frequently changing records around. I'll have to see if we can take advantage of lego to avoid some work on our side.
Re:Why IRC over SSL is pointless (2009)
by walrus01 on Wednesday April 13, 2016 @09:15PM
(#11493659)
You could have a very lightweight http server that only runs for the 30-second period of time needed to communicate with the ACME server for the certificate issue...
Many of our servers whitelist ports to harden themselves against attacks, and this whitelisting may not be done on the server itself (e.g. some of our servers do it on upstream networking equipment). We would also have to run some sort of HTTPd on ALL the servers in each round-robin being verified, which would essentially mean all our servers. DNS-01 is a much better fit for us (and our DNS server software makes it somewhat less painful).
It's theoretically possible to deploy Let's Encrypt now for IRC servers, which removes the cost issue. The new problems become the automated creation and deployment of IRC server certificates. You'll most likely need to use the DNS-01 challenge type, since most IRC servers aren't running a HTTPd and even if they were, you couldn't guarantee that the ACME server would pick the IP of the actual requesting server out of the "pool" records (e.g. irc.example.net). Using DNS-01 means you'll need to write code to interface with your DNS server, which also means securing that interaction (so other people can't modify your DNS records and get signed certs for your domain as well).
I actually manage the (signed) certificates for one of the IRC networks I'm an administrator for. Our two blockers for deploying Let's Encrypt are the aforementioned challenges with DNS-01, and the fact that our software currently validates server-to-server links using the fingerprint of each server's individual certificate, hardcoded into the configuration file. If we're switching certs every 3 months, we'll need some way to either distribute certificate configuration more efficiently or we'll need to change the ircd to verify the certificate chain instead of the fingerprint.
FWIW, our current deployment of signed certs is the "one cert to rule them all" deployed to all servers on our network. This is definitely not ideal, but it's by far the cheapest and easiest option prior to Let's Encrypt. All other options we evaluated were simply way too expensive ($X,000+), extremely labor-intensive (e.g. manually obtaining a new cert for every single server every year/every time something changed), or both.