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Re:John Oliver on the ugly state of credit reporting and bac... by joshuaheard on Monday April 11, 2016 @11:18AM (#11472067)
The problem here is that there is no effective identifier for people. We currently use Social Security numbers, which were not designed for that purpose. We need to have a new national identification system. I think a good idea would be to have two numbers: one public and one private. The public number would be used to identify you in public. The other would remain private and would be used as a confidential identification when matched to the public number, a major PIN, if you will.
Re:John Oliver on the ugly state of credit reporting and bac... by pmiller2 on Monday April 11, 2016 @11:28AM (#11472133)
I don't see what that solves. In the short term, it would be better and more secure than using SSNs, but in the long run, you should assume hackers will breach any database it gets stored in. That means one should always assume that no identifier is truly "private."
Re:John Oliver on the ugly state of credit reporting and bac... by cuchoi on Monday April 11, 2016 @11:28AM (#11472137)
In Chile we only use a public number. I think that having a private one is a major security hole. I find amusing how much you can do with the last 4 digits of anyone's SSN.
Re:John Oliver on the ugly state of credit reporting and bac... by Spooky23 on Monday April 11, 2016 @11:58AM (#11472418)
That's a big problem, because there are a ton of scenarios where many people are underrepresented and will fall through the cracks. The poor, elderly and migrant communities, which represent millions of people are often without good access to the types of proofing that will be required.

The end result is that you'll have business process driven by the national ID, and people will get cut off.

Re:John Oliver on the ugly state of credit reporting and bac... by spacehome on Monday April 11, 2016 @12:12PM (#11472568)
This doesn't solve the primary issue which is that in order for me to verify my identity I have to give the other party sufficient information to spoof my identity. The solution is obvious: asymmetric cryptography, where I can prove I know a secret without revealing the secret.
Re:John Oliver on the ugly state of credit reporting and bac... by joshuaheard on Monday April 11, 2016 @01:43PM (#11473551)
Can you elaborate?
Re:John Oliver on the ugly state of credit reporting and bac... by spacehome on Monday April 11, 2016 @03:26PM (#11474410)
I'll try.

There are a lot of ways to flesh out the details of such a system. The essence of all of them, though, is that each person has a public key which is known to everyone and simultaneously serves as a unique identifier to that person and a private key that is known only to the individual. Additionally, either the public key is derivable from the private key or both keys are derivable simultaneously via some process, but importantly, the private key is not derivable from the public key. And, depending on the system, messages can be encrypted with the private key and only decrypted with the public key, or vice-versa, messages can be encrypted with the public key and decrypted with the private key. The name for this broad category of cryptographic systems that have these properties is called "asymmetric cryptography".

To give a specific example of how it could work, each person creates a public-private RSA keypair, and publishes the public key. If I want to apply for a credit line with my bank, my bank can read the publicly available public key and use it to encrypt a nonce (secret token) and send me the encrypted nonce. I decrypt it using my private key and send the original nonce back to my bank, proving that I am the person in control of the private key, without ever revealing what that key is. Thus, if a malicious employee at my bank wanted to impersonate me to some other company, he wouldn't be able to (which is a huge flaw with the current system of handing over secrets to prove identity).

To tie public-private keypairs to real humans, you'd go to the DMV and give the government all the proof of identification that is required to receive a driver's license along with your public key, and the government could then publish that you're really the person associated with your public key, and all this still without the government having the knowledge required to impersonate you.

Re:John Oliver on the ugly state of credit reporting and bac... by joshuaheard on Tuesday April 12, 2016 @01:43PM (#11481763)
This is what I had in mind, but you explained it much better. Now, how do we get it implemented?!
Re:John Oliver on the ugly state of credit reporting and bac... by spacehome on Wednesday April 13, 2016 @01:51AM (#11486036)
Probably something involving smart cards, each with a display so you can confirm on the card itself every time you sign something. I would also add another layer of signing, so that you have a master key that you keep locked up in a secure location at home (wherever you keep your Social Security card today), and use that key very infrequently to sign and endorse another key you keep in your wallet. If you lose your wallet, then it's a simple matter to take your master key out of storage and revoke the previous wallet key and sign a new one. If you lose your master key, it's a more complicated process of going down to the DMV and proving your identity again to create a new master key.

But it's not going to happen because the costs of fraud in the current system are less than the costs of rejigging the whole whole thing.

Re:John Oliver on the ugly state of credit reporting and bac... by superuser2 on Monday April 11, 2016 @12:18PM (#11472632)
Any system of shared secrets is doomed to fail. Inevitably one of the dozens of entities trusted with them will leak them.

Let citizens approve specific authentication requests via a secure channel to a government website or with government issue smart cards or something.