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Re:Firefox vs. rthreads by exDM69 on Monday April 11, 2016 @09:53AM (#11471448)
It's not a fool proof mitigation for buffer overflow attacks, though. You can still write a bogus return address in a stack overflow and use return oriented programming (ROP) to do exploits with W^X. There are ways to work around address space layout randomization (ASLR) too.
Re:Firefox vs. rthreads by valarauca1 on Monday April 11, 2016 @10:22AM (#11471660)
No methodology in Infosec is every 100% prefect. You nest your defenses like Russian Dolls.

Each layer of protection fends off another class of attackers.

An attacker with infinite determination, money, or time will always push past your defenses.

Re:Firefox vs. rthreads by stefs on Monday April 11, 2016 @04:05PM (#11474668)
in reality, at some point it's just not cost effective anymore (for the attacker) and other targets become more promising.
Re:Firefox vs. rthreads by ben_bai on Friday April 15, 2016 @07:48AM (#11503552)
None of these mitigations is perfect. But how do you combine a exploit that has to deal with W^X, ASLR, randomized stack gap, stack cookie, randomized location of shared libraries and static programs. Seems pretty hard to me.