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A comment on WebUSB API: draft spec to safely expose USB device services to the web. Parent comment

Re:WebUSB API: draft spec to safely expose USB device servic... by ZenoArrow on Sunday April 10, 2016 @05:44PM (#11468322)
> "But fine, let's say the malware installs the driver and deletes itself. What then? How are they going to get the browser to navigate to their site, and the user to click the authorization button?"

You could do it a number of different ways. For example, could edit the hosts file (a.k.a. etc/hosts) to point to an amended site for a popular website address, could configure proxy settings on default web browser, could alter the browser shortcut to run a script in the background when the browser starts that scans for WebUSB-enabled devices, could set the driver up to check for updates and disguise the authorisation as the driver update confirmation, etc...

[ Parent | on HN ]
Re:WebUSB API: draft spec to safely expose USB device servic... by icebraining on Sunday April 10, 2016 @06:23PM (#11468467)
So this antivirus lets the malware install drivers, edit system files and/or replace shortcuts created by other applications, but not talk to the web, when nowadays almost every program connects to the web to check for updates. Do you know how far-fetched that sounds?

The reality is that if this malware gets enough permissions to install drivers, it can certainly talk to a regular device driver and communicate with the web. It doesn't need WebUSB for anything.

[ Parent | on HN ]