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A comment on If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of Plaintext iMessage Data. Parent comment

Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by thomasahle on Friday April 08, 2016 @02:45PM (#11456902)
What you are saying was true until this February when this paper came out https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/170

It hadn't been implemented yet I'm any practical crypto system that I know of, buy it certainly seems like we are finally going to have actually, provably hard problems to build out security om.

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Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by LeifCarrotson on Friday April 08, 2016 @04:05PM (#11457482)
I believe you made an unfortunate typo, substituting "probably" when you meant "provably".
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Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by thomasahle on Friday April 08, 2016 @04:16PM (#11457572)
Even auto correct finds it surprising :-)
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Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by swordswinger12 on Friday April 08, 2016 @04:06PM (#11457493)
The scheme in this paper is in the bounded-storage model...
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Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by thomasahle on Friday April 08, 2016 @04:18PM (#11457587)
It says you either have to use exponential time or quadratic storage. Schemes based on high memory requirements have actually been sought for a while, since (apparently) memory is considered less scalable than computation.
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Re:If You Can’t Break Crypto, Break the Client: Recovery of ... by swordswinger12 on Friday April 08, 2016 @10:45PM (#11459650)
No, I mean your original comment is inaccurate. The paper presents a time-space lower bound for parity learning, but the encryption scheme based on this result is only 'unconditionally secure' in a model where the adversary is restricted to having at most (n^2)/25 bits of storage. This isn't a general-purpose unconditionally secure encryption scheme, which is what your original comment implied.
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