Tier 1 secure messengers: all possible tradeoffs in favor of security made; use for worst-case adversaries:
- Signal/TextSecure - Pond - PGP† - OTR
Tier 2 secure messengers: serious secure messaging protocols that make some tradeoffs in favor of adoption and usability; use for normal messages of low sensitivity:
- WhatsApp - iMessage
Tier 3 secure messengers: secure messaging protocols with flaws, limited cryptanalysis, only content-controlled browser clients, &c
- Redacted to avoid flamewars.
Everything else: insecure; use only to bootstrap conversations to a Tier 2 protocol (knowing that if you're a state-level target, you're exposed even after you "upgrade")
- Google Talk - Facebook Messenger - AIM
I think WhatsApp would like to be a tier 1 secure messenger (they'd be the first mainstream tier 1 secure messenger!) and they have a shot at being that, but they're probably some years away from it.
† (I know PGP and OTR are cryptographically limited compared to Signal Protocol, but from an OPSEC perspective they're still a tier above iMessage.)
This means a malicious server could both store away your contacts and try to MITM you, risking detection if you do verify your fingerprint with the other party.
A messenger that really did "all possible tradeoffs in favor of security" would force you to verify the recipient, either in person or via a web of trust. I think not doing that is a perfectly acceptable tradeoff to protect 1 billion users from passive mass surveillance.
These are all UI issues though, the Signal protocol seems solid, and I'll be glad to see it used everywhere. Hopefully we will get clients that you could recommend to a journalist or lawyer and have confidence that they will be able to use it for secure authenticated communication.
Reasonable people can disagree, of course.
I hope it's obvious that, since OTR is in tier 1, these tiers aren't an analysis of how much I like different messengers. :)
Well, OTR is just the protocol, implementations vary in how well they make you authenticate your conversation partner. And PGP will whine at you a lot if you haven't marked a key as trusted. But somewhat agreed. A bad UI can ruin the security of otherwise solid crypto.
I just don't see how the security of Signal and WhatsApp are different. Assuming for a moment (very optimistically) that the user verifies the fingerprint and enables the alert for changed keys, they are using the same protocol with the same guarantees.
Are you factoring in some level of trust in their ability to write a secure client or run secure servers?
The last time this came up, inspired by a post by pbsd, I submitted a detailed write-up of a protocol Signal could use to avoid requiring users to submit their contact information: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11289223
It's a solved problem.
> A messenger that really did "all possible tradeoffs in favor of security" would force you to verify the recipient, either in person or via a web of trust. I think not doing that is a perfectly acceptable tradeoff to protect 1 billion users from passive mass surveillance.
Except it introduces another point of security failure. I would prefer to use a system like SDSI/SPKI's friend-of-a-friend naming, with a contact-sharing mechanism so that I could, say, know that I was talking to 'Sheila's Dad' or 'My Boss's Jim's Phone' (presented in a somewhat more user-friendly way, maybe 'My Boss → Jim → Phone' or something).
Maybe in the future when prop224†† is implemented the encryption will be more solid.
† https://media.ccc.de/v/32c3-7322-tor_onion_services_more_use...
†† https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/asn/torspec.git/tree/prop...
That's what's so exciting about the WhatsApp announcement. WhatsApp is by all accounts a pretty great messaging application, and it doesn't just have decent encryption now; it has best in class encryption specifically designed to protect a messaging application, designed by experts who thought about this problem for a long time.
The nice thing about using the onion address (transport layer) is that you have mandatory e2e authentication with only one id that solves multiple real world problems with bgp/dns/tls.
How would you propose to go further from current state-of-the-art WhatsApp to stop leaking meta-data? I know Ricochet is open to use a stronger encryption layer on top of Tor †.
Aww... shucks.
The article links to the technical white paper[0] which explains why your points are invalid.
> I'm still inclined to trust apple's iMessage a bit more
Do you have any proof why iMessage is more secure or is that statement also baseless?
[0]: https://www.whatsapp.com/security/WhatsApp-Security-Whitepap...
It states that:
- The private keys remain on the devices (which is good, but they don't need them to read your messages)
- The messages can't be read by WhatsApp (they don't say anything about their parent company Facebook or governments though).
If you read all the whitepapers and alert messages, you can totally read them in a way that allows Facebook to see, store and analyze the clear-text of every message you're sending, without anybody lying anywhere.
// edit: got my answer here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11432629
I'm curious, is that because of what they did in the FBI case, or for technical reasons? IIRC iMessage would allow Apple to add public keys which they (or the FBI/$ADVERSARY) control as a sort-of backdoor as well. I can't say that I've been keeping track of Facebook's position or history on this topic, so it might or might not be fair to say that Apple deserves more trust here, but on a technical level there's not much of a difference.
So, it feels like for the average consumer, a product like iMessage ticks all the necessary boxes. While WhatsApp adding features like the ability to compare your keys via a QR code looks cool, I have to wonder how many users will actually take advantage (and how would they even know if that number or QR code really represents what they think it does?)
I'm surprised by this statement. After recent events I'd say the imessage protocoll is a weird ad-hoc construction that failed to follow basic modern crypto constructions like authenticated encryption and forward secrecy. I don't expect anything alike from the signal protocol.
So ignoring actual protocol and implementation flaws (I agree with you that WhisperSystems will probably be ahead of Apple there), both rely on the key management being done in a thrustworthy manner.
And this is where I trust Apple more than Facebook, especially in light of the recent FBI events. If Apple says they are not maliciously injecting fake public keys for the purpose of surveillance and marketing, I tend to believe Apple.
If Facebook is silent about this, I assume they are doing it.
Also, iMessage's crypto protocol is cryptographically broken. It's been patched together in ways that prevent the obvious attack, but don't actually fix the underlying issue. Doing so involves replacing the protocol. In the mean time, those patches are not fool proof and someone may get around them.
Does it? It allows me to verify a key. It doesn't give me any ability to control what other keys it's working with.
This only helps me to make sure that the message I just got, I actually got from the person it's claiming to be. It doesn't give me any other protection though.
I agree about the broken iMessage crypto and I hope to see Apple upgrade the protocol in a future OS release. With their quick uptake of new OSes, a fix could propagate relatively quickly.
1) I would assume Facebook still gets unencrypted access to my address book for use with their shadow profiles
2) We have zero control over what key the client encrypts the messages for. Is it only the other peer's phone? Or is it for the peer's phone plus Facebook for analysis of the messages?
Especially 2) is of some concern to me (against 1 I can't protect myself anyways because if people add me to their address books I'm screwed anyways). From that perspective, I'm still inclined to trust apple's iMessage a bit more especially after recent events.
The only safe solution right now is to compile your own signal client and use that, of course at the cost of reach because nobody else is on Signal.
WhatsApp might be a good compromise at least for only semi-important messages: The probability that any of your contacts has WhatsApp is much, much higher than the probability of them having Signal running. On the other hand, whatever you're sending over WhatsApp is likely going to be used by FB (and then possibly handed out to governments and/or stolen by attackers).