Here is an article that discusses the context surrounding Herrera v. Collins: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl....
Problem is to determine what is both significant and new.
Even somebody else confessing or new evidence showing up that the convicted has an alibi to the crime may not be deemed significant, as somebody must judge whether the new information is true.
For example, blindly trusting confessors to speak the truth would open the door for groups of people to keep each other unconvicted (A gets indicted and, a few months later, convicted, B suddenly shows up claiming he was with A, giving A an alibi, a year later A gets convicted again because that alibi didn't turn out to be watertight, C (who may already be in jail for something else) confesses, C gets convicted, D, who's dying, confesses, etc.)
So, some judge must determine whether new evidence warrants reopening a case. If that judge is (consciously or unconsciously) biased, this easily can lead to injustice. From what I read, that seems to have been the case quite a few times in the US.
The hard part is how to establish that alternate confessions or new evidence are really significant (as they indeed sometimes are).
More importantly, it would be procedurally problematic if convicted criminals could appeal on the basis of a claim of innocence, even if it's due to new evidence. Following procedures is more important than getting at the truth. (I conjecture it's because getting at the truth is unreasonably difficult. For example, there's no guarantee that a subsequent trial will be more reliable than the original.)