I have no expectations that the relationship between law enforcement and technology companies will improve. I guess I've just accepted this situation as the "new normal".
The main point is, that this should not be acceptable.
One of the central features of democracy is that it's a large ship but does turn toward the majority. You/I/we want that ship to turn towards a right to strong crypto systems enshrined in law? Work on influencing that majority.
Because the fact of the matter is that a majority of Americans don't even understand encryption. And to paraphrase McAvoy from The Newsroom and point at one of the reasons more social change wasn't effected from the 60s, in a democracy an idea being right is less important than it being known and agreed with.
All that is required for cynacism, on the other hand, is to sit on ones couch.
> I have no expectations that the relationship between law enforcement and technology companies will improve.
I absolutely agree with this, but that Brave New World has its own dangers. Apple could technically construct a device to enable secure drug trafficking and place its levers of control over that device outside US jurisdiction. Then begin taking a cut of the enterprise. Control is power, and if we shift it from the US government to corporations, then corporate accountability starts to become a lot more important.
Because that's ultimately what we're talking about now. Imagine in 20 years when we're having the conversation about the poor US government standing up to Apple or Google.
Exactly, and not only that, but (potentially) unknown to Apple.
I felt the same way when I hit the article link, but changed by mind when Bruce Schneier made the more nuanced argument.
Of course the vulnerability already existed. That's not what he has a problem with: the problem is that now there is a commercially-known but secret vulnerability. Which is a different thing than an unknown vulnerability.
Newer hardware revisions, etc etc, but the biggest issue he takes is that the US government is supporting this practice (and in doing so basically acting like malware authors). Again, that may be realpolitik, but isn't something that we should support as a policy position.