Re:Your USB cable, the spy: the NSA’s catalog of surveillanc...
by cat-dev-null on Friday March 25, 2016 @10:16AM
(#11360181)
Another reason OS peripheral firewalls and firmware IDS need to exist because right now, IO is a welcoming attack surface.
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Re:Your USB cable, the spy: the NSA’s catalog of surveillanc...
by monocasa on Friday March 25, 2016 @05:48PM
(#11362920)
How do you create a firmware ID system that provides anything meaningful? Wouldn't an hostile device simply spoof another device's IDs?
Re:Your USB cable, the spy: the NSA’s catalog of surveillanc...
by cat-dev-null on Wednesday March 30, 2016 @03:18AM
(#11387496)
Your questions seem to conflate two things: nonrepudiation (which includes integrity) of firmware and A3E for I/O.
- Treat firmware like a file, save hashes of them in a public-key signed baseline db. Basically hash everything that can be dumped and throw alerts if anything in the targeted policy changes. (Tripwire for firmware)
- Thinking about it again, v2: end-to-end encryption is needed from driver/app through to device silicon. Key management might require "pairing" would be an initial secret provided separately (like the security model of an Entropy Key, but perhaps not a burned-in secret). Given that most actual drivers are proprietary anyhow, consider today's drivers as http:// when https:// everywhere is needed to defend against bus-sniffing.