To me, if I want full "evidence custody chain" style logs of device location, for physical equipment, that would be the way to go. Now, the real question is, how much would you really trust the government mail program vs a NSL or interdiction for implant vs a private company vs a NSL or interdiction for implant. I think there is room for discussion there, but I would tend to side with the government one, because the company will have very little recourse, but the gov entity is likely to be staffed by bone-headed gov employees, who are surprisingly good at bad policy pushback when compared to their private counterparts. Perhaps I'm wrong on that though. Sometimes I find interesting insights into IT by listening to lawyers...
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/secpubs/rainbow/tg008.txt
Note: Yet another for everyone to remember when you hear someone say the old security certifications were just red tape. Stopping interdiction is just red tape. Haha.
Here's a basic set of recommendations for supply chain security that provides at least a start on various aspects:
http://www.albint.com/en-us/company/Suppliers%20Documents/Su...
U.S. government is freaking about about what they, err the Chinese, can do. They're implementing their own research with stuff like this:
http://www.technology.org/2015/07/09/sandia-tamper-detecting...
http://www.darpa.mil/program/supply-chain-hardware-integrity...
Personally, I think being able to print or wire-wrap the electronics yourself can be helpful given they might be able to attack inside the PCB. It's a speculative attack I came up with many, many years ago that I can't remember if anyone has implemented. It would be difficult to detect with some of these internet-of-things style chips implemented w/ minimal packaging.
There's a lot to this subfield of IT. Verification of incoming components & manufacturing process with trusted couriers is the baseline, though.
Definitely, although an important question is whether they want to solve the problem and are able to solve the problem. (We still don't know how these package interdictions are done -- what induces the packages to be turned over to governments for tampering.)
It would be incredibly interesting to learn what Gemalto and CISCO have meanwhile managed to come up with in order to tighten their supply chain and ensure their clients they don't receive compromised equipment.