News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Micropackages and Open Source Trust Scaling by mbrock on Thursday March 24, 2016 @11:53AM (#11353798)
Maybe we could start to publish signed approvals of specific package hashes.

For example: "I, mbrock, think that pad-left v1.0.3 with hash XYZ seems like an uncompromised release."

Then the tool that upgrades packages could warn when a release isn't trusted by someone you trust (or transitively via some trust web scheme).

The approval system becomes like a "release review" process.

Re:Micropackages and Open Source Trust Scaling by chromakode on Thursday March 24, 2016 @03:39PM (#11355781)
Yes! I've been working on this scheme at https://github.com/chromakode/signet
Re:Micropackages and Open Source Trust Scaling by m_eiman on Thursday March 24, 2016 @12:06PM (#11353928)
That would probably be doable using a PGP-style trust system. Don't know if it'd add much security in practise though, since the "trust these declarations of trust" decision would most likely be automated.
Re:Micropackages and Open Source Trust Scaling by mbrock on Thursday March 24, 2016 @12:46PM (#11354324)
Yeah, just GPG with Keybase and some place to publish the messages.

Trustworthy people wouldn't approve releases automatically... but then, who's trustworthy?

Like Pynchon wrote, paranoia is the garlic of life...

Re:Micropackages and Open Source Trust Scaling by chromakode on Thursday March 24, 2016 @03:41PM (#11355801)
You still have to decide who to trust, but having a collection of many independent parties verifying a package can be a useful signal even if you don't have anyone directly in your trust chain. It makes it a lot harder for rogue releases to go unnoticed.