That BeOS demo did not heavily use privileged interactions. Mostly it showed computation which is the same on any OS. The best thing it showed was a process scheduler which was good at giving priority to things that a user would care about. A more interesting test would be serving files or building software.
I think one should be careful not to read too much into CVE numbers. People aren't exactly trying to mess with KeyKOS, Haiku, QNX, and other weird things. Few people want to bother. None of the Linux problems are inherently specific to monolithic design. The best you could say is the you might have a sandbox that makes things more difficult for the attacker. On the other hand, restarting means you give attackers more chances to succeed.
Btw, one person here who wrote about QNX desktop demo mentioned doing productivity stuff while compiles ran in background with no lag. So there's that use case except not for BeOS. The link below will show you BFS was more like a combo of NoSQL DB, files, and streaming server:
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2010/06/the-be...
Due to its nature, compilation and build systems are about the slowest things you can do on it. I've seen numbers ranging from 2.5x to 20x slower than Linux but they didnt share specs. I'd swap out the magic filesystem for a simpler one if on a development box. BeOS was aimed at creating, editing, and viewing streaming media, though. Did that very well.
Re sandbox more difficult
No kidding! That's the entire point: get it right or make it harder to beat at least. Monoliths on mainstream hardware are amusement parks with free rides and victims everywhere for attackers. Microkernels on COTS hardware and even modular, typed monoliths on POLA hardware are a series of sandboxes with adult supervision during play and movement. Quite a difference in number of problems showing up and damage done.
Re more chances to succeed
You keep repeating this too without evidence. Attackers need vulnerabilities to succeed. They'll know some to use ahead of time or they won't if we're talking OS compromise. A flaw in one module lets them take one module no matter how many restarts. A flaw in two with a flow means they'll get it in first try. This is why you design it so each flow and individual op on them follow security policy.
The only time restarts give attack opportunities is if your using probabilistic tactics (eg ASLR) or they're waiting for intermitent failure (eg MMU errata). Any high assurance system better not exclusively rely on tactics (ever) and should account for latter (eg immunity-aware programming).
All in all, anything you've said about microkernel systems applies to monoliths in various ways. One model just limits system-hosing faults and hacks a lot better. The question is do you want to accept that risk to squeeze out max performance or eliminate that risk with acceptable performance? Microkernels choose risk reduction while mainstream monoliths choose performance.
I don't see why we keep getting these theoretical counters given the proven results of microkernel performance in the field. Tell me why microkernels are too slow when they can only do this on 90's era hardware:
https://youtu.be/BsVydyC8ZGQ?t=16m9s
Then, tell us why we should sacrifice isolation of malice and faults in favor of kernel-mode code with properties like this:
https://www.cvedetails.com/product/47/Linux-Linux-Kernel.htm...
Our side produced highly reliable and secure systems plus high-performance systems. It was always done with a small group with little time. The monoliths took a decade and thousands of man hours to do the same. It's up to you people to justify why those hours were well-spent.
"while for say an exokernel the opposite is mostly true."
An exokernel is a microkernel...