Foreign relations, yes. The exercise of military power, no. Especially not creating a permanent wartime condition, secret courts, etc. where military power, including spying, is exercised within the US and against the people.
First, it has simply never been the case, since the time of the Presidencies of the founders themselves, that espionage was limited to times of war, or for that matter to countries with whom we had declared war. The President has always been able to spy on other countries.
Second, Rayiner himself concedes the distinction between spying on US citizens (an activity restricted by the Fourth Amendment) and spying on foreigners abroad (an activity not restricted by the Fourth Amendment).
I.8: Congress, not the President, has the power to declare war; to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a Navy.
II.2: Treaties require advice and consent of the Senate.
Bill of Rights: No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner... The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
Look no further than the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, our third President and a staunch opponent of a powerful executive branch: practically upon obtaining office he launched a covert military offensive without the authorization of Congress! If Jefferson wielded a particular kind of executive power, and Adams advocated for that power, and Madison did the same, it becomes difficult to suggest that the framers intended something different in the language of the Constitution they wrote.
Spying is a routine military activity that is intrinsic to foreign relations, an area where the Constitution gives the President unique powers. Seizing steel mills, on the other hand, is a major intrusion into domestic activity within Congress's usual domain. It's not so clear why Youngstown would direct the conclusion here.
More generally, there are a lot of people who believe that the framers intended to give the President great powers when it came to foreign relations and the exercise of military power, and didn't intend for Congress to be able to check those powers. One of the motivating rationales of having a unitary executive was so that the government could respond to internal and external threats decisively without waiting for hundreds of senators and congressman to get on board. It was set up that way to address the concerns of people who thought that a democracy would be weak and indecisive in the face of foreign threat.