Put aside for a second that 4A is not in play here, because the phone's real owners consent to the search.
4A delegates to the courts the power to determine what evidence is and isn't in-bounds in an investigation. Nowhere in 4A will you find a prohibition on imaging someone's phone. Assuming the judiciary approves of a warrant, virtually nothing is out of bounds to a warranted search. That's what we're talking about here: a search that a judge has authorized.
It's that power that we're talking about clawing back because of a loss of trust in the government. And what I'm saying is, it's pretty silly to pretend that you can claw back the power to collect evidence without calling the whole state into question.
To me, that's an obvious example of evidence the government would like to have in many cases, but we clearly decided it cannot. A judge cannot grant a warrant compelling an individual to waive their 5A rights. That seems to have direct bearing on the idea of providing individuals a right to strong personal encryption.
Admittedly, there are many edge cases (furnishing information about a third party that one has personally encrypted), but we've bounded what the government can and cannot have before.
Although from another comment I made I generally agree with your position that this is a pretty serious point of balance between the individual and the state due to the nature of encryption.
Or to turn it around, what has the government historically desired to legally do after obtaining a warrant that it has been unable to do?
We never made locks or strong doors illegal. The closest would probably be mandating log retention at telecom providers for a certain period of time.
The question of how cryptography might stymie whole classes of search entirely is germane to the question of whether we should pass laws restricting default-on cryptography (obviously, I don't think we should). It is not germane to this case, which is not about "mathematics" or even "security", but instead whether the government has the power to compel a product manufacturer to assist in a search of their products.
Richard Clark seems to think the NSA would have the capability, and they might, but the FBI apparently (and believably) doesn't.
Apple "assisting in a search" is a little overly summarizing in my opinion. I think there's a difference between "we received your warrant, here's the information we have" and "we received your warrant, we will dedicate engineers employed by our company to actively exploit the security we designed into our products."
Is there precedent for compelling lockmakers to provide technical expertise in defeating their own lock systems? I can't imagine that's never come up historically.
Is already limited by the 5th Amendment and other caveats. So it's never been unlimited in the US.