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Re:Docker and Security [pdf] by jron on Thursday March 10, 2016 @09:51AM (#11259472)
Absolutely. It should also be mentioned that many of the Xen vulnerabilities are actually due to qemu and that emulation can mostly be avoided by using PV/PVH.

The Xen attack surface is then reduced to about 20 hypercalls (even less for ARM). http://xenbits.xen.org/docs/unstable/hypercall/index.html

Re:Docker and Security [pdf] by jerdfelt on Friday March 11, 2016 @06:16PM (#11270273)
The number of hypercalls isn't a good indicator of the attack surface area.

As examples:

There is a full x86 instruction decoder which is technically not part of the hypercall interface. x86 instruction encoding is surprisingly complicated. There was a vulnerability in that code: http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-123.html

Handling x86 page tables and all of the various feature bits is also surprisingly complicated. This is part of the hypercall interface, but there was also a vulnerability in that code: http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-148.html