News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Docker and Security [pdf] by geofft on Thursday March 10, 2016 @08:17AM (#11258958)
I think that statement is factually wrong, but before I get into that, I don't see the relevance of a claim about x86 virtualization (which is what de Raadt's post was about) to the article here, which involves no x86 virtualization at all. There's some discussion of Linux container isolation, but the analysis of whether you can get that to be more secure than uncontained Linux is basically completely different to an analysis of hardware virtualization (leaving aside that it is generous to call a data-less opinion from a decade ago an "analysis"). Am I missing a reason why this quote is relevant?

Here's the context: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=119318909016582

Re:Docker and Security [pdf] by Majestic121 on Thursday March 10, 2016 @10:05AM (#11259560)
I don't think the actual technology he was talking about is relevant.

The message is that people writing the linux kernel make a lot of mistakes, and it result in security holes. Those same people (or the same kind of people) also write X (Docker, x86 virtualization, whatevs...), so mistakes and security holes are to be expected.

I do not necessarily agree with the message, but this is how I understand it.

Re:Docker and Security [pdf] by geofft on Thursday March 10, 2016 @10:52AM (#11259888)
I understand that message, but it's so little of a message that it doesn't seem useful. Why should we believe that it's equally easy to make mistakes and security holes when writing kernels, OS virtualization, and hardware virtualization? The security models of these things are very different (for instance, a kernel has multiple user accounts, hardware virtualization has just "admin" and "VM"), the underlying designs are very different in complexity, the requirements for legacy compatibility are different, etc. etc. etc.