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Re:How We Build Code at Netflix by riskable on Wednesday March 09, 2016 @11:30AM (#11253871)
The other replies here are great but let me give you the layman's version of what "immutable infrastructure" means:

If it works for me it works for everyone.

You never patch or upgrade immutable infrastructure. You just replace what you've got with a new VM or container. Containers being preferred because they can be started & stopped near instantaneously and there's nothing like a virtual BIOS that could have different configurations like with VMs.

You don't stand up a VM or container then "log in to configure it". Once the VM is "up" that's it. You're done. At that point you just need to point your load balancers/DNS at the new stuff then take down the old stuff.

One interesting aspect of immutable infrastructure such as this is that it is completely incompatible with loads of existing security policies and what would have been considered "best practices" just a few years ago. For example, you might have a security policy that states that everything must be scanned within 30 days for malware/out-of-date packages/whatever. Yet with immutable infrastructure your hosts or containers may only be up for a few days before being replaced!

So when your security team freaks out because none of your hosts/containers are showing up in their systems you'll have a lot of explaining to do =D

"We need to scan your hosts so we can ensure that you're installing security patches."

"We don't do that."

"You don't install security patches?!?"

"Yeah, well, you see..."

Trust me when I say that trying to explain how it all works and why it's more secure than old school deployments is not easy!

Re:How We Build Code at Netflix by dastbe on Wednesday March 09, 2016 @11:47AM (#11253983)
this is why your security team should be integrated into how you (securely!) build and deploy software. in this specific case, that would mean maintaining the OS layer Dockerfile and scanning the dependency tree for build artifacts.
Re:How We Build Code at Netflix by riskable on Wednesday March 09, 2016 @12:21PM (#11254214)
Yeah, it's actually a lot more complicated than that. Let's assume the security team creates the Dockerfile. It'll look like this:

    FROM ubuntu
    WORKDIR ${foo}   # WORKDIR /bar
    RUN developer_script.sh
So now with each new container update you'd need someone from the security team to audit/review `developer_script.sh`. It's kind of pointless if your goal is fast deployments.

If you just need to make sure your developers don't make a mistake in terms of securely configuring their containers (and making sure to always use the latest software) then you simply scan them before the canary stage. The problem there is, "what are you looking for?"

Also, there exists only one tool to scan Docker containers (OpenSCAP) and if your security team doesn't like it, well, you're screwed: https://github.com/OpenSCAP/container-compliance

The other problem is that OpenSCAP only checks the container's packages for compliance. It doesn't actually scan the container's filesystem for things like JREs and bundled libs. So if you're using Docker best practices by keeping your images as minimal as possible you may not even have a package tool inside your containers. In that case how do you check for things like out-of-date versions of Java?

Another problem is you assume there's some modicum of control over what's inside the containers before they're deployed. We're in charge of creating the infrastructure for running containers with the promise that end users (who would be various application teams) can make their own containers (or at least their own Dockerfiles) and deploy them on our infrastructure.

We can work with them to help develop, say, a Kubernetes pod config for their app but as far as what their app is or what gets bundled with it we'll have no knowledge after the first successful deployment.

Re:How We Build Code at Netflix by dastbe on Wednesday March 09, 2016 @12:42PM (#11254369)
I never said you need or should have the package tools inside your container, but you do need to be able to track the lineage of what was put into those containers so you can easily search for ex. deployed container revisions with an out of date Java version. This is where you need a team devoted to build that creates this kind of infrastructure. Otherwise, you end up with difficult to answer questions about your infrastructure.

tl;dr I assume there's some control because there should be.

Re:How We Build Code at Netflix by cyphar on Wednesday March 09, 2016 @05:12PM (#11256088)
> So when your security team freaks out because none of your hosts/containers are showing up in their systems you'll have a lot of explaining to do =D

> "We need to scan your hosts so we can ensure that you're installing security patches."

> "We don't do that."

> "You don't install security patches?!?"

> "Yeah, well, you see..."

If you use a tool like zypper-docker, you can create a new image quickly that applies just the security patches. Currently it only works for SUSE-derived containers but we're planning on making it distribution agnostic.

There's also some work we're doing on connecting Docker containers running on SUSE enterprises to connect with SUSE Manager (aka spacewalk), so they would show up in their systems.

You can find most of this stuff in github.com/SUSE.

Re:How We Build Code at Netflix by riskable on Thursday March 10, 2016 @10:07AM (#11259568)
zypper-docker is kinda pointless. Just re-build from your Dockerfile using the latest upstream image. It takes like 10 seconds (depending on how many external dependencies need to be fetched).

Our Docker registry pulls down the latest images (that we use with our Dockerfiles) multiple times daily. So if the author of the Dockerfile just puts "FROM whatever:latest" they are guaranteed to have all the latest/patched software whenever they "docker build".

Re:How We Build Code at Netflix by cyphar on Saturday March 12, 2016 @07:12AM (#11272539)
Sometimes you don't want to update all of your dependencies (isn't that the whole point of Docker), you might want to just apply security updates. Just putting "FROM whatever:latest" is a bad idea, because you don't know whether the "latest" will suddenly break your image.

The point of zypper-docker is to quickly roll out security fixes with essentially no downtime. zypper-docker also allows you to quickly check the health of all of the images and containers on your servers, so you can figure out which ones need updating. Also, zypper-docker allows you to apply RPM patches (something that's quite crucial for enterprises).

So no, it's not pointless. In fact it solves a problem that not many people have been working on solving: updating containers.

Re:How We Build Code at Netflix by riskable on Saturday March 12, 2016 @10:09PM (#11275997)
Actually, the correct and only way to find out if ":latest" breaks your image you create your image using ":latest"!

How are you going to know if the latest version of the upstream image breaks your package if you don't try it? E whole point of continuous integration is that there are no surprises when it comes time to push to production.

If ":latest" breaks your image you had better know:

A) Immediately.

B) What went wrong ASAP.

The integrated testing (that you're supposed to use with Docker best practices) should reveal if there's a problem and if it doesn't you'll still catch it during QA testing of your image.

The fact that ":latest" breaks your image should be nothing more than a few minutes to days of troubleshooting. While you're doing that your existing production images will keep on chugging away.

The only rule that you must not break is that you have the next release of your image out the door, ready for production within 30 days. Why? Because that's the maximum (hard-coded) lifetime we (and you should too) allow images to stay running.

Re:How We Build Code at Netflix by goldbrick on Friday March 11, 2016 @04:43PM (#11269760)
But then you risk having untold other packages move under your feet. This is what concepts like "unattended-upgrades" address.
Re:How We Build Code at Netflix by riskable on Saturday March 12, 2016 @10:12PM (#11276010)
The risk associated with breakage from an automated upgrade is an order of magnitude less than the risk associated with being hacked because you weren't keeping up to date.