The idea of borrowing cheap in one place and investing for higher yield isn't new. Banks and investors borrowed German bonds to invest in Greek bonds, and investors borrowed in Japan to invest in Iceland. It works for a while until it doesn't. When you're levered the end goes from bad to worse, and usually has cyclical implications. (Forced sales to make margin calls depresses the stocks even more as people rush the exits)
An interesting but self-defeating ploy. If the system is set up to shrink/collapse, I'm not going to put my money into said system, even if you vaguely promise me 5-6% returns until collapse.
Not that my opinion matters as my net worth is marginal, and this outlook will probably get some of the doom and gloom crowd to sign up with his fund.
Funny how much of finance is marketing...how much of everything is marketing...
If it was positive NPV for them to keep quiet, every investor would.
CNBC and Bloomberg TV are full of talking heads all day long, though they only scratch the surface on potential fund managers.
Surely the model is not perpetually sustainable?
In other terms it could be viewed as arbitraging participants who don't care to participate in the market for a marketable good. For example, if Jet.com was selling an item at a fixed loss (to expand marketshare or hit some VC targeted numbers, etc) and you just kept buying that item and selling it at the market rate on another exchange.
The other piece to this is that one is not simply just sitting back and doing nothing but rather accumulating a lot of risk from other parties who do not wish to do so. In itself that is reasonable, but when the parties involved don't have the capital to cover losses should they appear, that is another issue.
Accumulating risk might be an apt description of the model. However, the risk is not isolated. Do we really want people not only sitting back, doing nothing, but actively accumulating risk? Sounds like a disaster waiting to happen.
When an involved party is a bank, they, by charter, will not have enough capital to survive some losses.
Gross spends 5 pages exposing the flaws of the current financial/economic investing climate, then does a 180 and says the model is fine, and that Janus has some vague advantage in reliably finding a) discounts b) arbitrage and c) tail-end volatility - short term profit centers that all banks are searching frantically for right now.
Seems like a rather strange and disconcerting investment outlook, with Gross ultimately resigning to do his best within a broken system. Does not bode well as an outlook for actual reformation of the system or a call to action in this direction.