Re:The DROWN Attack
by tptacek on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @07:08PM
(#11207224)
Right. Well, you're not going to get the exploit from a simple description of the attack. DROWN is built on some well-known attacks on RSA, most notably Bleichenbacher's 1998 padding oracle attack, but the specifics of how to manipulate an RSA ciphertext to make TLS records intelligible to SSLv2 are hairy even if you've implemented BB98 before --- I'm going to call this "stunt Bleichenbachering".
So it's not very important that you understand exactly how to go from "errors/exceptions generated by the target" to "recovery of plaintext". Even if you understand the specifics of those kinds of attacks, they're even more complicated (and fun) here.
The interesting nut of the attack is: there's a well-known error oracle in both TLS and SSLv2, but it's long since been mitigated in both protocols. However, details of the crappy crypto in SSLv2 conspire to make the mitigation for padding oracles in SSLv2 ineffective, and you can use the SSLv2 oracle to attack TLS ciphertexts if TLS and SSLv2 ever share keys.
So it's not very important that you understand exactly how to go from "errors/exceptions generated by the target" to "recovery of plaintext". Even if you understand the specifics of those kinds of attacks, they're even more complicated (and fun) here.
The interesting nut of the attack is: there's a well-known error oracle in both TLS and SSLv2, but it's long since been mitigated in both protocols. However, details of the crappy crypto in SSLv2 conspire to make the mitigation for padding oracles in SSLv2 ineffective, and you can use the SSLv2 oracle to attack TLS ciphertexts if TLS and SSLv2 ever share keys.