But I don't know why I'm letting you off the hook on this. Can you be as specific as you can about the additional moving parts you're referring to? Is your comment about the difficulty of getting constant time key agreement or verification specific to legacy Weierstrass curves? And are you concerned about timing leaks in something other than scalar multiplication? If so, what are those other things?
When you say there are "more moving parts", are you referring to the fact that there's both a modular reduction and a scalar multiplication that need to be protected?
This thread and others like it make me think we need a security (and general) debate series.
I was a blog-arguer before HN, and a Usenet person before blogs, and a BBS person before that, and most of what I've learned in my whole career is traceable somehow to Internet arguments.
I really do think I'm right about RSA, though.
Maybe you're crypto's Bernie. Feel the Ptacek.
RSA: "I learned that as an undergrad. It's just multiplication, I'll use GMP!"
ECC: "Whoa what the hell is this? I better use a library."
These are the same developers who ask on StackOverflow how to decrypt MD5, of course.Rainbow tables. Duh!
(Though I wonder if you can make a pedantic argument, that if the domain of your one-way function is suitably restricted (eg to passwords humans actually come up with) they do become bijective.)