The only way to prevent a tool from being misused is to not create that tool in the first place.
If you _love_ that Apple is making it so hard for unauthorized access to your device, why do you also think they should create a tool that allows unauthorized access to your device? Are you so sure that you'll never be on the wrong end of a government fishing expedition?
I'm generally law abiding, yet I still don't think the government should be able to view my private records just because my name came up on some secret watchlist that I'm not allowed to know about and could entirely be because my name matches someone else's name.
The only reason the FBI didn't ask that Apple fully decrypt the device is because they know that bruteforcing a small keyspace is trivial if the device doesn't have countermeasures - not because they thought they were overstepping the bounds of their request.
What's being asked for in no way allows the government to view your private records without a warrant.
The FBI didn't ask Apple to decrypt the device because that would be impossible.
The FBI made clear that this was a special case, just one solitary phone to decrypt from a nasty terrorist. And no one likes terrorists, so we can all agree that we need to read his secret data.
But then it's revealed that there are dozens, perhaps even hundreds of these requests in queue, and few involve terrorism.
And after the government is successful at coercing Apple into creating special software, why do you think that the next stop won't be to coerce apple into handing over signed code that will work on any phone (or even signing keys themselves)? After all, if the government needs to read data off of thousands of phones, surely they can't wait for Apple to do them all.
> The FBI didn't ask Apple to decrypt the device because that would be impossible.
Decrypting the phone is only impossible if the user had a strong passphrase, which is unlikely, so if Apple turns off the brute force checks, decrypting the phone means only cycling through 10000 or 100000 passphrases. A few hours or a few days at most.
If decrypting the device is impossible, then the FBI wouldn't be asking for Apple's help.
Apple cannot decrypt the phone. Removing the brute force checks is not the same as decrypting it, because even in the nightmare scenario where the FBI get their hands on this modified software, and randomly start installing it without a warrant, it only works if they have the device and you've used a crappy pin code. If you use a strong pin, you're protected, still. Except for the whole contempt of court thing.
I am a huge advocate for privacy, and I understand the technical details, but like you, I can't see what magically protects iPhones from search warrants.
I _love_ that Apple have made it so hard for unauthorized access to my device, but I cannot understand on what basis they're making the current stand, given that the FBI are asking specifically for a modification that will let them attempt to brute-force the device, rather than anything more magical.