No, I proposed 3 different ways of hacking the UDID in that comment. 1) disrupting the read of ECID in transit, 2) re-writing ECID by hacking the BPP, 3) a SHA1 hash collision. Any one of the 3 will do.

Even then you cannot "flash anything" to the phone. But you can flash a build signed by Apple which hard-codes a UDID check.

Wouldn't these mechanisms apply to key verification? How exactly can you argue that you can modify data in realtime inside the phone's architecture, but couldn't possibly modify data in realtime inside the phone's architecture?

Only certain parts of the hardware responsible for key storage and verification are architected to be resilient against physical and electronic attack, but the entire phone is not.

For example changing the WiFi or Bluetooth MAC is not locked down and effects the UDID. Because the UDID was never intended to be a way to bypass the device encryption it was not designed with anywhere near the same level of care and sophistication as handling the encryption key itself.

> For example changing the WiFi or Bluetooth MAC is not locked down and effects the UDID. Because the UDID was never intended to be a way to bypass the device encryption it was not designed with anywhere near the same level of care and sophistication as handling the encryption key itself.

I never suggested the UDID. Please don't ascribe a claim to me that was never made. SHA512 the serial and macs independently. Job done.